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Abstract 
In the last half-century we have observed dramatic growth in international trade, but equally 
dramatic changes have occurred in the nature of the world trade. Among recent trends in the 
world trade is the process of fragmentation characterized by geographical dispersion of the 
production activity. Such an environment creates a strong need for efficient coordination 
mechanisms connecting separate blocks of the fragmented production process where 
transportation is one of such mechanisms.  
This thesis focuses on transport sector and more specifically, maritime transport. The 
objective is to provide a theoretical framework aimed at determining how changes brought 
about by fragmentation affect shipping firms that serve transport needs of the fragmented 
industries. The problem is approached by identifying the key variables in the profit function 
of the shipping firm and describing central relationships between them. 
The first part presents the phenomenon of fragmentation in order to provide an overview 
over changing patterns of institutional organization and structural shifts in the nature of the 
world economic order. Then, requirements to transportation systems stemming from the 
needs of the fragmented chains of production are defined. The second part is devoted to 
transport economics. It introduces the main variables in the profit function of the shipping 
firms distinguishing between bulk and liner segments. The final part synthesizes preceding 
parts and studies the effect of fragmentation on the revenue and costs of the maritime 
companies.  
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Part I: GLOBALIZATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION 
1. Globalized economy 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent economic development has been characterized by globalization which in its simplest 
form refers to the increasing geographical scale of economic, social, and political 
interactions. These interactions include international trade and related traffic of imports and 
exports, the expanding mobility of capital and investment transaction. A more liberalized 
trade regime with lower or abolished tariffs and convergence of legal and regulatory systems 
promote a higher degree of interaction between countries and regions. Falling transportation 
costs are also said to contribute to the growing world trade. As a result, for many countries 
trade grows faster than GNP making the world increasingly integrated through trade.  
These patterns of globalization accompanied by technological advances and lowered cost of 
services have shifted the structure of trade towards fragmentation of the production process. 
Fragmentation implies outsourcing amounts of the production process and represents a 
breakdown in the vertically integrated mode of production which can happen domestically or 
abroad. Many factors are said to account for fragmentation. It is argued that there is no single 
driving force but rather a conjunction of many forces acting simultaneously (Curzon Price 
2001). Among them are wider markets, greater specialization, lower transport and 
communications costs, lower transaction costs, technological progress, lower efficient 
minimum scale of operations, more demanding customers, more numerous agglomerations 
generating greater externalities before getting congested, more efficient and demanding 
capital markets. These forces open up new opportunities for fragmentation both domestically 
and internationally.  
It is evident that a modern economy is highly dependent upon transport as the circulation of 
goods and people within the global economy must be supported by transportation. 
International transportation systems experience increasing pressures to support the growing 
demands of international trade and the globalization of production and consumption. Goods 
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transport is essentially concerned with the movement of natural resources and goods at 
different stages of the production process. It lays the foundation of the complex logistical 
process by which natural resources located in one area are transformed into products which 
consumers want at a different location. 
Such a strong connection between the global economy and transportation suggests that 
changes in the global environment will inevitably reshape the operational environment of 
transport and logistics industries. The objective of this thesis is to study how increased trade 
flows coupled with other trends in the world economy affect the maritime industry and 
which consequences they imply for profitability of the shipping firms.  
1.2 The phenomenon of fragmentation 
1.2.1 Introducing the concept 
An important characteristic of the globalization of trade, and in particular of trade in 
manufactures, is an increased fragmentation of production.  
The production process can be viewed as a series of sequential activities needed to convert 
raw materials into a final commodity. An integrated production process is characterized by 
inseparability of constituent activities which are performed in one single location. This is 
illustrated in the upper part of Figure 1. Fragmentation becomes possible once the various 
phases of the production process can be separated physically. Fragmentation generally 
means to divide a previously integrated production process into distinguishable blocks, or 
fragments, and move them to various locations that are most suitable for each activity. The 
activities can be performed independently and production blocks do not need to be situated 
in geographical proximity to one another. The middle and lower part of Figure 1 exhibit 
simple and more complex fragmented production respectively. Production blocks are 
connected to one another by service links which take on an important function in the 
fragmented production chain. 
Physical separability of various stages of the production process is a prerequisite but not the 
only condition of successful and profitable fragmentation. Location of fragmented 
production blocks critically depends on advantages and disadvantages of each economic 
region. Exploiting differences among economic regions allows firms to minimize costs and 
possibly gain other benefits e.g. in form of strategic advantage.  
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Fragmentation applies not only to production process but also to distribution and 
consumption. In fact, any process aimed at producing a good or providing a service can be 
presented as a sequence of separate activities. 
 
1.2.2 Types of fragmentation 
Fragmentation has a complex nature and in reality can appear in different forms. The term 
was first defined by Jones and Kierzkowski who focused mainly on whether production 
blocks are spatially separated or not. Since then a number of researchers addressed particular 
aspects of the phenomenon using own terminology. For instance, Feenstra (1998) refers to 
disintegration of the production process as a synonym of outsourcing that can happen 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
Inputs Markets 
SL SL 
Inputs Markets 
SL SL SL 
Integrated production process 
 
Simple fragmented production 
More complex fragmented production 
Markets 
SL SL 
SL SL 
PB: production block 
SL: service link 
 
Figure 1. Fundamental concept of fragmentation 
Source: Jones and Kierzkowski (2001)  
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domestically or abroad. Venables (1999) examines the consequences of falling transport 
costs for intermediate goods in the context of geographical dispersion of production blocks 
that lead to formation of vertical and horizontal MNEs. Hummels et al. (2001) study the 
effect of trade barrier reductions in vertically specialized trading chains extending over many 
countries with each country specializing in particular stages of production sequence. They 
refer to fragmentation as vertical specialization in which the use of imported inputs in 
producing goods is the key aspect of these vertical linkages. Grossman and Helpman (2001) 
study outsourcing decisions by resolving a trade-off between vertical integration and vertical 
specialization in terms of costs and benefits. Curzon Price (2001) explores fragmentation 
from the angle of geographical dispersion and outsourcing versus internalizing of firm‟s 
activities in order to identify sources of change for the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
 
PB: production block 
F: fragment of production process 
A: domestic fragmentation 
B: international fragmentation 
C: domestic outsourcing 
D: international outsourcing 
 
Figure 2. Types of fragmentation 
Source: Kimura and Takahashi (2004) 
As it follows from the summary on the use of the term, vertical specialization, intra-product 
specialization, global production sharing, outsourcing and disintegration of the production 
process are often used as synonyms to fragmentation in the economic literature. However, 
each term captures a different aspect of the phenomenon. In order to summarize the 
definition and coverage of each terminology, Kimura and Takahashi (2004) classify 
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fragmentation along two axes, according to whether it crosses the national border and 
whether it occurs within one firm. The former case is called spatial dimension and the latter 
is organizational dimension. The complex nature of fragmentation is illustrated in Figure 2 
and Table 1 that replicate one another. 
Spatial dimension 
The spatial or geographical dimension refers to physical dispersion of production, when part 
of the chain of production is moved to a different geographical area with transactions taking 
place either within the same firm or between different economic actors in the open market.  
Spatial dimension comprises domestic and international fragmentation when production 
blocks remain in one country or are spread across several countries respectively. Two 
extreme outcomes of this dimension are locally and internationally produced goods.  
Organizational dimension 
Whether transactions take place at arm's length between different economic actors, or within 
the same firm, refers to the organizational dimension. This dimension concerns corporate 
strategy rather than the organization of production process. In this dimension firms operate 
on the continuum running from vertically integrated „do-it-all-yourself‟ type of firm to 
highly specialized enterprise which outsources all but its core activity. The result is 
integrated versus specialized firms depending on the extent to which firms adopt 
fragmentation.  
Spatial 
Organizational 
Crosses national border 
No Yes 
Transactions 
Within one firm 
Domestic 
fragmentation 
International 
fragmentation 
Arm‟s length 
Domestic 
outsourcing 
International 
outsourcing 
Table 1. Types of fragmentation 
Source: The table is based on Kimura and Takahashi (2004) 
Both spatial and organizational dimension have advantages and disadvantages which are best 
illustrated by the example of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
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1.3 Multinational Enterprises 
1.3.1 Definition  
Although spatial fragmentation, i.e. moving separate elements of the production process to 
different (usually lower cost) locations, does not necessarily involve multinationality 
(Venables 1999), MNEs bear major responsibility for this process.  
MNE is a firm which owns a significant equity share of another company in a foreign 
country (Barba Navaretti et al. 2004). Generally, its activities are spread among home 
country and host country (countries). Activities in the host country are defined as foreign 
affiliate or subsidiaries and are acquired or expanded by means of foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  
 
Figure 3. Horizontal and vertical FDI 
The literature of international economics distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. 
In vertical FDI fragmentation results in one or several activities being undertaken in a 
different location. The major motive behind vertical FDI is to find low-cost locations for 
parts of the production process and take advantage of factor price differences. A typical 
example of vertical FDI is a foreign affiliate operated from abroad. In contrast, in horizontal 
MNE at least some of the firms‟ activities are replicated in two places. Horizontal MNEs 
PB 
PB PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
PB 
Horizontal FDI Vertical FDI 
National border National border 
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operate in multiple countries and each plant sells its products to the local market. Figure 3 
illustrates the location of production blocks in case of vertical and horizontal FDI. 
1.3.2 Multinational production and composition of frade 
Venables (1999) studies the consequences of falling transport costs for fragmentation of 
production, formation of MNEs and the value of trade. His conclusion is that falling 
transport costs for intermediate goods trigger fragmentation. This process can give rise to 
both vertical and horizontal MNEs and increase as well as decrease the value of trade. The 
consequences depend on the relative factor intensities of upstream and downstream 
production. 
In his model, Venables (1999) focuses on vertical and horizontal MNEs assuming that there 
is no outsourcing, i.e. all activities are performed within one firm. The firms operate in two 
economies, Home (capital abundant) and Foreign (labour abundant) characterized by 
perfectly competitive environment. Furthermore, firms have constant returns to scale and 
produce good YZ that consists of intermediate component Y (upstream) and final product Z 
(downstream). ty is ad valorem
1
 trade cost for shipping intermediate component Y. Shipment 
of Z also occurs at a certain cost. In addition, there is trade in commodity X whose main 
function is to maintain payments balance between two countries. I will exclude X from 
description of the model for simplicity and will rather focus on the fragmented good YZ. 
Although the model does not include value-to-weight ratio of the goods, it may be used to 
analyze how international trade flows change in response to fragmentation. Its most useful 
application, from the viewpoint of this thesis, is the ability to predict value-to-weight ratio of 
the goods to be transported. The value-to-weight ratio is important because it is a variable in 
shippers‟ modal choice decision and a determinant of the importance that transport costs 
have for the shipper. This issue will be discussed later. 
In order to be able to assess the change in composition of total trade, i.e. proportion of goods 
with high and low value-to-weight ratio, an assumption about value-to weight ratio is 
needed. I assume that Y component has a lower value-to-weight ratio than Z, and both Y and 
Z have a lower value-to-weight ratio than the final good YZ. This assumption is pure 
                                                 
1 Ad valorem – by value (Lat) The cost of shipping according to the value of the good (Source: Wikipedia). 
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arbitrary as in reality the relative weight of goods and their value-to-weight vary 
considerably for each particular product category. 
As mentioned earlier, when firms divide their production between countries they become 
either vertical or horizontal multinationals depending on factor endowments of production 
locations and factor intensities of upstream and downstream production. The model explores 
the effects of reducing ty in two situations: when upstream production is labour intensive and 
when downstream production is labour intensive. These two cases have different 
consequences.  
The starting point for the analysis is the base case when good YZ is fully manufactured in 
Home and then exported to Foreign. Thus, Home supplies both domestic and foreign market, 
and the value of trade is the value of YZ good shipped in one direction. The experiment 
starts when the cost of shipping Y, ty, is gradually reduced until it becomes profitable to 
fragment production, geographically separating Y and Z production and moving labour 
intensive process to the labour abundant Foreign country. The degree of fragmentation will 
depend on ty and the formation of vertical or horizontal MNEs as well as the value of trade 
will depend on the relative factor intensities of upstream and downstream production. 
Relatively labour intensive upstream activities give incentive to move them to labour 
abundant Foreign country provided sufficiently low ty. At a certain level of ty all quantities of 
Y will be produced in Foreign, while the final assembly (YZ production) remains in Home. 
Such organization of production refers to vertical multinationality. Though YZ exports from 
Home to Foreign remain at the same level, the total value of trade increases due to high 
proportion of Y shipped in both directions; first from Foreign to Home as an input for the 
next stage of production, and then back from Home to Foreign, embodied in the final output 
YZ. Assumption about lower value-to-weight ratio of Y compared to Z means that the 
proportion of less valuable goods in the total trade volume increases. The percentage of high 
and low value goods in the total trade will depend on the volume of Y traded, which in turn, 
depends on the cost of shipping Y, ty. 
Conversely, in the second case downstream activity is assumed to be labour intensive 
relative to upstream. This suggests moving Z production to labour abundant Foreign, while 
Home as a capital abundant country hosts Y production. Consequently, all Y production is 
retained in Home and some of Z production is moved to Foreign. The reason for not moving 
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all Z production to Foreign is the costs of shipping Z. This means that Foreign Z production 
only reaches the level at which it is sufficient to supply the Foreign market, while the Home 
market is served entirely by Home production. Essentially then, downstream assembly (YZ) 
is divided between Home and Foreign, taking place in the location where the product is 
consumed. Such replication of production refers to horizontal multinationality. As a result, 
Home produces the quantity of YZ needed to supply the Home market and intermediate 
component Y for both Home and Foreign production. Foreign country produces component 
Z needed to satisfy demand in the Foreign market and imports intermediate Y from Home 
for the final assembly YZ. Since the final assembly in Foreign fully depends on availability 
of intermediate good Y, costs of shipping Y, ty, play an essential role in the decision to 
fragment production process.  
When production relocates to supply each market locally, trade in Z component goes to zero. 
Trade between Home and Foreign is reduced from the final good YZ to intermediate 
component Y. Assuming that YZ has higher value-to-weight than Y, such shift denotes the 
reduction of the value of goods traded and decrease of the value-to-weight ratio. 
Variables:   
 Y – upstream 
 Z – downstream 
 YZ – final good 
 H – home country (capital abundant) 
 F – foreign country (labour abundant) 
 Assumption: value-to-weight Y < value-to-weight Z < value-to-weight YZ 
Factor 
intensities 
Labour intensive upstream 
(K/L)y < (K/L)z 
Labour intensive downstream 
(K/L)y > (K/L)z 
MNE Vertical  Horizontal 
Trade flows Higher fraction of Y is shipped in 
both directions (from H to F as 
input to YZ and, from F to H as 
part of the final good YZ ) 
Trade in final products is replaced with 
trade in intermediates 
Value of 
trade 
Increases  Reduces 
Value-to-
weight 
More products with lower 
value/weight ratio. 
Shift from trade in high value to low 
value goods. Lower value/weight ratio. 
 Table 2. Fragmentation and multinational production 
Source: The table is based on Venables (1999) 
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To summarize, fragmentation is possible due to different factor intensities of different stages 
of production, but the process is first triggered by reduction of ty, the cost of shipping the 
intermediate component Y. The effect of reducing cost of shipping depends on the relative 
capital intensities of upstream and downstream production. If upstream activities are labour 
intensive, vertical MNEs develop and the volume of world trade increases. If downstream 
activities are labour intensive, firms become horizontal MNEs, just moving some of their 
final assembly to the country in which it is sold. This reduces the value of trade as trade in 
final products is replaced with trade in intermediates.  
As for the consequences for the value-to-weight, the conclusion fully depends on the 
assumption about the value-to-weight of the components in question. However, the main 
purpose was to illustrate the possibility to predict the value of trade on the basis of the model 
by Venables (1999). Table 2
 
provides an overview of the consequences. 
1.3.3 Costs and benefits of fragmentation 
Spatial dimension 
A firm that chooses to split off some of its activity from an otherwise integrated production 
process, faces some trade-offs in terms of costs and benefits presented in Table 3. The major 
benefits of such decision come from factor cost differences among countries and better 
market access. The shortcomings are foregone economies of scale and economies of 
integration. 
 Horizontal Vertical 
Costs 
Disintegration costs  
Plant-level returns to scale foregone 
Disintegration costs 
Benefits 
Market access:  
Saving trade costs  
Strategic advantage 
Factor cost saving 
Table 3. Spatial fragmentation: costs and benefits to the firm 
Source: Barba Navaretti et al. (2004) 
Costs of geographical dispersion 
Firms typically benefit from economies of scale at firm level and at plant level. Firm-level 
economies of scale are usually associated with intangible assets and are related to such 
activities as R&D, brand development, finance operations and headquarters staff of the firm. 
When the firm splits some of its activity, it retains firm-level economies of scale but 
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sacrifices plant-level economies of scale. Therefore, multinationality is likely to be induced 
by high firm-level economies of scale in combination with low plant-level economies of 
scale. It is argued that sectors in which firm-level economies of scale are important prefer to 
serve foreign markets through subsidiaries than through exports (Barba Navaretti et al. 
2004). As for plant-level economies of scale, their influence is investment specific, 
depending on whether it concerns vertical or horizontal FDI. Plant-level economies of scale 
are expected to discourage horizontal FDI as the splitting up of firm‟s activities leads to the 
loss of efficiency on the plant floor. However, for vertical FDI, plant-level economies of 
scale sometimes favour the fragmentation of production because in vertical FDI the activities 
are not split up but moved to another location.  
Concentration of the firm‟s activities in one place offers benefits in form of economies of 
integration that refer to e.g. technical efficiency and savings from low scale of coordinating 
operations. An example of economies of integration from Barba Navaretti et al. (2004) is 
steel production, where disintegration means that steel cools during transportation and has to 
be reheated at the subsequent stage. In addition to the loss of technical efficiency, 
disintegration also brings about trade costs and costs stemming from growing complexity of 
the value chain. In the fragmented environment, these costs are referred to as service link 
costs. Service link costs are addressed in Chapter 2. 
Benefits of geographical dispersion 
Geographical dispersion of the firm‟s activities pursues two goals, namely possibility to 
exploit differences in factor endowments and factor costs across countries, and better access 
to market. 
Since each production process requires production factors in different proportion, 
fragmentation allows for better resource allocation and a closer match of factor intensities 
and factor productivities for each stage of production. However, factor costs constitute a 
higher share of total costs in the upstream production stages and therefore tend to play more 
important role for location decisions in the upstream.  
Better market access is the second purpose of geographical fragmentation. When supplying 
foreign markets, the firm faces a choice between exports and subsidiaries. The size and 
importance of the market is undoubtedly of prime concern for market access. By moving 
production closer to the market, the firm avoids trade costs and barriers that accompany 
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exports and reduces the marginal cost of supplying the market. The marginal cost curve 
represents the firm‟s short-run supply curve. Any reductions in the marginal cost will change 
market equilibrium and will cause a change in the competitor‟s behaviour. Therefore, 
presence in the local market is of strategic importance as it shapes firm‟s interactions with 
competitors. 
In summary, access to low-cost inputs and market access are the major driving forces behind 
geographical fragmentation. Access to low-cost inputs is the main motivation of vertical 
FDI, while horizontal FDI are more concerned with better market access. 
Spatial fragmentation: domestic versus international 
Whether geographical dispersion will occur domestically or internationally depends on a 
range of factors. On the one hand, international fragmentation is potentially more beneficial 
as differences in productivity and factor prices across countries are larger. On the other hand, 
necessary costs for international fragmentation are higher due to geographical distance and 
variety of restrictive trade policies and domestic regulations. However, international 
fragmentation has proliferated by virtue of recent advances in transportation and 
telecommunications technologies, reduction in barriers to trade and investment that have 
reduced the cost of cross-border production sharing. 
Organizational dimension 
Costs and benefits 
The company‟s choice between internalizing, (i.e. performing the activities within one firm) 
and outsourcing refers to the organizational dimension of fragmentation, and each option has 
its advantages and disadvantages. Internalizing brings direct costs of performing an activity 
(like plant-specific fixed costs) and a cost of not using the comparative advantage of a local 
producer who may have better information about local conditions such as labour skills, 
demand conditions and administrative procedures that enables him to produce more cheaply 
than the MNE.  
The advantage of internalizing is saved costs of market relations that consist of transaction 
costs, imperfect information and contractual incompleteness.  
Contractual incompleteness occurs when it is not possible to write a contract that would 
specify every eventuality that may arise between two parties. This causes a hold-up problem 
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which manifests in suboptimal investments on the supplier‟s side and inefficient scale of 
production. The supplier might fear that his commitment in the form of e.g. investment 
necessary to produce output will put him in an unfavourable position by weakening his 
bargaining power, while the MNE may avoid its obligations due to contractual 
incompleteness. In such case, the supplier‟s decisions are likely to be suboptimal reducing 
the total return from outsourcing for the MNE. 
In turn, when relying on market transactions the MNE runs the risk of dissipation of its 
intangible assets such as technical know-how, reputation and knowledge capital. As for 
knowledge capital, the firm might choose to keep it internal if it is too costly to transfer it to 
third parties or if this transfer will jeopardize firm‟s comparative advantage. If the 
knowledge constitutes the core competence of the company and is simultaneously vulnerable 
to theft, the company is better off when protecting it and internalizing the activities. In case 
of reputation, the problem arises from too few incentives that the third party may have to 
maintain the goodwill of the MNE.  
Outsourcing is associated with agency costs as it necessitates monitoring the third party 
whose actions cannot be perfectly observed. When firms expand internationally, the 
informational asymmetry between parties increases, and the agency problems become more 
acute. When agency costs are particularly relevant, the firms are likely to expand by means 
of subsidiaries rather than specialized agents. 
Table 4 summarizes the main costs of using the market. 
Type of 
transaction 
Type of FDI Problem  Consequence 
Transferring 
intangible assets 
Horizontal 
Vertical 
○ Imperfect appropriability of 
knowledge 
○ Imperfect appropriability of 
reputation 
○ Dissipation of 
proprietary knowledge 
○ Dissipation of 
goodwill 
Carrying out one 
stage of 
production 
Vertical  
○ Hold-up with incomplete 
contracts 
○ Agency costs with 
incomplete information 
○ Inefficient scale of 
production/sales 
○ Underinvestment 
Table 4. Organizational dimension: the cost of arm’s length transactions 
Source: Barba Navaretti et al. (2004) 
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Organizational dimension: managerial versus market coordination 
Curzon Price (2001) visualizes the trade-off between outsourcing and internalization by 
focusing on transactions cost (Figure 4). 
The activities of the firm result in a certain number of transactions that need to be 
coordinated, and coordination costs are positively correlated with the number of transactions. 
The coordination can be executed by management or by market.  
 
Market is an efficient coordinating and monitoring system, but its major disadvantage in the 
context of fragmentation is transaction costs. The transaction costs of market coordination 
(TC) is a non-linear function, low for few transactions, rising as the number of repetitive 
decisions increases, but falling again over a certain number of new decisions. There is a 
possibility to save transaction costs by internalizing activities and coordinating them within 
one firm through management, but only up to a point because of diminishing returns to 
management. The cost for managerial coordination (MC) is high for new and complex 
decisions. It starts to decline when the number of decisions rises and managers become more 
familiar with the tasks and acquire experience and training. The costs rise again as the 
growing complexity due to large number of transactions reduces the efficiency of 
Number of transactions/ decisions 
C
o
o
rd
in
at
io
n
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o
st
s 
MC1 
TC1 TC2 
MC2 
Figure 4. Management versus market 
Source: Curzon Price (2001) 
MC1 is a cost of managerial coordination, and TC1 is a cost of market transactions. The market 
coordination is preferred for low and high number of transactions, while managerial coordination 
is efficient between the two extremes. Recent trends in the transactional environment move the 
costs of managerial and market transactions to MC2 and TC2 respectively, thereby reducing the 
area of managerial efficiency and encouraging use of market mechanisms. 
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management. This implies that the curve for management cost of coordination is concave-
shaped. 
Combined together, costs of market coordination and managerial coordination suggest that 
the market coordination is preferred at both ends of the transactions spectrum, while 
managerial coordination is efficient between the two extremes. Thus, the choice between 
arm's length transactions and transactions within one firm depends on the interaction of 
management cost and cost of market coordination. 
Recent trends in the transactional environment move the border between areas of market and 
managerial efficiency. Trade liberalization, falling transport costs, development of cheap and 
reliable electronic communication and international outsourcing by which inputs are 
available worldwide at lower price, contribute to reduction of market transaction costs. In 
terms of Figure 4, the TC function shifts downwards to TC2, reducing the area of efficient 
coordination by management. Such drop in market transaction costs will reduce the 
advantage of internalizing activities within the firm, and therefore reduce the size of the firm. 
This trend to downsize is reinforced by the fact that customers become more and more 
demanding. The industry's response to higher requirements is mass customization made 
possible by market mechanisms. Mass customization implies that each product is available 
in numerous variants. Only markets can handle such a degree of specialization and 
differentiation. This trend can be represented by a shift to the left of the right-hand side of 
the MC1 curve to MC2: managerial costs start rising at a lower level of transactions, further 
reducing the area over which firms are more efficient than markets as coordinators. Firms 
gradually shift to market coordination, and the number of arm‟s length transactions prevails 
over internal transactions resulting in a higher extent of organizational fragmentation. 
1.3.4 Determinants of FDI and location decisions 
In their decisions concerning the type of FDI (vertical or horizontal) firms face certain trade-
offs. Avoiding trade costs through horizontal FDI implies foregoing economies of scale, as 
production is distributed across several plants. Exploiting international differences in factor 
prices through vertical FDI means incurring costs of geographically disintegrated 
production.  
The benefits and costs of each decision are the variables that resolve these trade-offs and 
determine the type of FDI. The variables fall into two distinct groups: pertaining to firms or 
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industries and pertaining to countries. These variables were discussed in the section above 
and are summarized in Table 4 that anticipates the influence of different factors on the firm‟s 
decision to expand by horizontal or vertical FDI. 
Determinants 
Predictions by type of investment 
Horizontal Vertical 
Related to types of firms or industries   
Firm-level economies of scale  + + 
Plant-level economies of scale - ? 
Product-specific trade costs + - 
Costs to disintegrate stages of production - - 
Differences in factor intensity across production stages ? + 
Related to types of countries   
Trade costs (distance, trade barriers, etc.) + - 
Market size + ? 
Factor cost differentials ? + 
Table 5. Determinants of FDI 
Source: Barba Navaretti et al. (2004) 
The decision to invest abroad is followed by another important decision, namely location of 
FDI. The major variable in the location decision is agglomeration or industrial clustering. 
Barba Navaretti et al. (2004) conclude from the literature that there is some evidence that 
agglomeration plays a role in determining the location of FDI. They point out several 
reasons why MNE choose to join industrial cluster. These are benefits from knowledge 
spillovers, better markets for specialized factors, forward and backward linkages between 
customer and supplier firms. Also, the uncertainty that foreign firms experience in their 
investment decisions might give incentive to follow predecessors in location choice. 
Technology sourcing is an important motive as the concentration of firms with advanced 
technology will induce knowledge spillovers and facilitate access to foreign technologies. 
One more benefit from clustering is lower service link cost and especially cost of transport.  
MNEs are not just beneficiaries but also active participants in agglomeration process. The 
entry of a foreign firm is often accompanied by the entry of suppliers. This is especially true 
for developing countries, where foreign firms have strong competitiveness vis-a-vis local 
firms in terms of technological capability and access to credit and market. Therefore, the 
entry of foreign firms attracts local actors. Gradually, more firms become involved in the 
agglomeration and large industrial clusters of foreign and domestic firms emerge in a 
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particular area. Then such clusters form international production/distribution networks 
(Kimura, Takahashi, 2004). 
1.3.5 Global Production Networks and transportation 
Previous sections present fragmented production as a chain of operations required to produce 
and distribute a good or a service. As its name suggests, a production chain is strictly linear. 
However, these essentially linear structures of production chains form complex networks of 
inter-firm relationships. It was mentioned that MNEs are active participants in the cross-
border production sharing and therefore are major contributors to formation of global 
networks. Such networks are referred to as production/distribution networks, global 
production networks (GPN), or global commodity chains (GCC). GPNs represent 
functionally integrated networks of production, trade, and service activities that cover all 
stages in a supply chain, from the transformation of raw materials through intermediate 
manufacturing stages to the delivery of a finished good to a market. Hesse and Rodrigue 
(2006) argue that the value-generation process in GPNs is interdependent with the 
distributional capabilities of global freight forwarders, emphasizing the role of transportation 
as an integral part of the value-generation process within GPNs. The increasing importance 
of the transportation and logistics industries is explained by the fact that the spatial and 
organizational fragmentation of manufacturing is accompanied by flows of information, 
commodities, parts, and finished goods. Together with attempts at reducing inventories they 
lead to smaller, more frequent and synchronized shipments. Such shifts in value chains place 
intense pressures on transport systems to support these flows and require a high level of 
command of logistics and freight distribution.  
In terms of fragmentation framework exhibited in Figure 1, transportation belongs to service 
activities, or service links. Service links are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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2. Service links 
2.1 Cost of service links 
Geographical separation of production fragments necessitates a coordination mechanism that 
would link remotely located production blocks and ensure that they interact in the proper 
manner. This auxiliary function is performed by service links that comprise such activities as 
transportation, insurance, telecommunications, quality control, and management 
coordination. Obviously, these coordination activities are associated with certain costs.  
Fragmentation theory claims that firms choose fragmentation when (i) production costs in 
production blocks can be reduced and (ii) service link costs for connecting production blocks 
are not too high in comparison to production costs savings (Kimura et al. 2007). This logic is 
exhibited in Table 6. On the one hand, the reduction in production costs comes from 
differences in location advantages. Location advantages include factor prices, agglomeration 
effects, infrastructure services, and policy environment. On the other hand, service link costs 
must be low enough not to cancel production cost advantages (Kimura et al. 2007).  
2.1.1 Components of service link costs 
Service link costs comprise multiple components listed in Table 6. The costs are divided into 
main categories: trade costs, investment costs, communication costs, coordination costs, 
agglomeration costs. Agglomeration affects service link costs and at the same time is a part 
of location advantages, and is therefore included in both groups. All the components raise 
transaction costs within networks and hence determine the extent of fragmentation and the 
scope of international production/distribution networks.  
The first category of service link costs is trade costs, whose division into subcategories is 
based on Anderson and Wincoop (2004). They claim that direct evidence on trade costs 
come from costs imposed by policy (tariffs, quotas) and costs imposed by the environment 
(transportation, insurance, etc). Information costs, contract enforcement, costs of use of 
different currencies, legal costs and local distribution costs are mainly associated with 
wholesale and retail distribution activities of the firm going multinational.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Transportation costs will be given more attention in Chapter 3, while this chapter is devoted 
to service links in general.  
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 Category Subcategory Details 
Service 
link 
costs 
Trade costs 
Transportation costs 
Direct: freight charges, insurance.  
Indirect: preparation costs, time 
costs  
= inventory-holding + 
depreciation cost 
Policy barriers Tariff and non-tariff 
Information costs Search cost for suppliers and buyers 
Contract enforcement costs Direct and indirect costs 
Costs associated with the 
use of different currencies 
Exchange rate volatility, risk hedge 
and uncertainty 
Legal and regulatory costs Cost of legal and regulatory procedures 
Local distribution costs Cost of utilization of local 
infrastructure 
Investment costs 
Policy barriers FDI discriminating measures 
Information costs Search cost for suppliers 
Contract enforcement costs Direct and indirect costs 
Legal and regulatory costs Cost of  legal and regulatory procedures 
Communications costs Telecommunications, internet fee 
Coordination costs 
Timeliness 
Indirect costs due to delayed 
deliveries 
Uncertainty 
Due to coordination of activities 
from production to shipment 
Agglomeration 
Networking IT networking, business networking 
Cluster of suppliers Access to suppliers 
Location 
Advan-
tages 
Cluster of homogenious 
firms 
Externality 
Distribution costs Reductions possible by increasing returns 
 
Concentration of similar 
types of labour  
Availability of workers by virtue of 
agglomeration effects 
Low production costs 
Running costs 
Low level of wages, factor abundance, 
access to imported intermediate with 
low tariff rate 
Fixed costs Access to inexpensive infrastructure 
Proximity to large markets Large number of customers 
Other geographical features E.g. port availability for transit trade 
Table 6. Location advantages and components of service link costs 
Source: Kimura and Takahashi (2004) 
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The second category is investment costs. A firm that locates production blocks abroad, is 
adversely affected by policy barriers and problems related to FDI as a part of service link 
cost. The last but not the least are communication and coordination costs. These costs 
usually accompany the simultaneous operation of production blocks in several countries. 
Some of these two cost categories have been reduced by virtue of recent technological 
advances, while others remain due to their nature (Kimura, Takahashi 2004). 
Service link costs possess two important features. First, components of service link costs can 
be divided into fixed costs and running costs. For example, transportation and 
telecommunication costs are mostly running costs, while information costs and policy 
barriers to investment have strong nature of fixed costs. Second, the importance of service 
link costs significantly varies across goods traded. If intermediate goods are traded many 
times within a network, trade costs become more important for trade in parts and 
components than trade in other goods (Kimura, Takahashi 2004). 
2.1.2 Service link model 
A simple diagram (Figure 5) incorporates service link costs into the basic discussion of 
fragmentation. It shows the relationship between the degree of fragmentation, the cost of 
production and output levels. The model is based on an important assumption about scale 
economies. The fragmentation scenario allows for two possible locations of scale economies; 
production blocks and service links. It is argued that increasing returns to scale are to be 
found in the service link sectors rather than on the plant floor. In the simplified version of the 
scenario, production blocks exhibit constant returns to scale. As for the service links, the 
costs do not rise in proportion to levels of output due to the fixed element invariant to the 
output level. Such cost behaviour provides strong increasing returns to scale in service links. 
In Figure 5 rays 1-4 represent the cost of four production processes. These production 
processes are different with respect to integration/disintegration of production and returns to 
scale. The slope of each ray is the aggregate marginal costs of the respective production 
process. Ray 1 refers to a fully integrated production process and reveals the costs of 
production undertaken in a single production block exhibiting constant returns to scale. As 
all production is concentrated in one location, there is no need in coordination mechanism. 
The service link costs are zero, and the ray starts in the origin. When two domestic locations 
are selected to take advantage of geographic differences in factor prices and productivities, 
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domestic fragmentation occurs, and the cost of production moves to ray 2. Domestic 
fragmentation lowers aggregate marginal costs (the slope of ray 2 is less steep than the one 
of ray 1), but introduces service link costs that are captured in the diagram by the interval 0-
A. Such fragmentation is cost-effective only for output levels exceeding A'.  
Rays 3 and 4 illustrate alternative processes when foreign sources become involved in the 
production sequence in order to take advantage of differences in international factor prices. 
International fragmentation decreases marginal costs even more, but raises the costs of 
connective service links. It becomes profitable only if the extra costs of service link activities 
are offset by the lower marginal costs obtained by a closer match of factor intensities with 
factor productivities for each fragment. 
 
In general, the balance between decreased marginal costs and increased service link costs 
determines whether fragmentation will take place at all and whether it will expand to the 
next level. 
Production 
cost 
Output 
0 
1 
A 
B 
4 
2 
3 
C 
A'  B' C' 
Figure 5. Fragmentation and the cost of production  
Source: Jones, Kierzkowski (2005) 
Ray 1 refers to the costs of fully integrated production process, while rays 2-4 are the costs of 
production processes with various levels of fragmentation. The slope of each ray is the aggregate 
marginal cost of production. Transition from ray 1 to ray 2 becomes profitable once the output 
level reaches A'. At this point service link costs 0-A are compensated by lower marginal cost of 
production. The bold line exhibits a minimum cost schedule. 
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In the aggregate, average costs of production decrease with output for a given pattern of 
fragmentation, i.e. along one ray, and marginal costs of total production drop at each 
intersection of production cost rays. These intersections are the points where the degree of 
fragmentation increases which occurs at output levels A', B', C' in Figure 5. Such increases 
in the degree of fragmentation form integrated minimum cost schedule indicated by the bold 
line at the outer border of rays of production. The integrated minimum cost schedule exhibits 
increasing returns to scale with increases in the degree of fragmentation occurring at output 
levels A', B', C'. 
2.2 Interplay between main variables 
Figure 5 suggests that two factors induce transition to a higher degree of fragmentation; 
higher level of output and reductions in the costs of service links. The relationships are 
presented in two separate sections, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
The discussion is based on the assumption about positive correlation between the level of 
output and the volume of trade. Indeed, the firm‟s output is limited by demand in the 
market(s) it supplies. In order to increase the level of output the firm needs access to other 
markets which is possible by means of trade. Trade permits the firm to reach distant markets 
and thus expand the volume of production. Also, instead of waiting for the offers, the firm 
might act proactively and search for opportunities to increase the volume of production by 
expansion of its geographical market. Such behaviour induces more trade flows between 
locations of production and consumption resulting in higher volume of trade. 
2.2.1 Fragmentation and output 
There is interdependence between produced volume and degree of fragmentation.  
Impact of fragmentation on output level 
Fragmentation works as a catalyst increasing the volume of trade, and this for several 
reasons. First, fragmentation results in trade in parts and components that enter the world 
trade in addition to manufactured and finished goods. As more items become tradable in the 
market, the total volume of trade expands. Second, the fact that large flows of parts and 
components cross border several times during the manufacturing process generates even 
more trade flows. Third, fragmentation and component specialization eliminate the need for 
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firms or countries to gain competency in all aspects of production. Once international 
production/distribution networks involve many countries, and each country specializes in 
narrower parts of the vertical production chain, participating countries start both exporting 
and importing parts and components taking advantage of price differences. Developing 
countries that generally lack advantage in the integrated manufacturing process get 
opportunity to specialize on just one facet of production and participate in production 
networks. By allowing developing countries to join production networks, fragmentation 
contributes to enlargement of markets. Forth, fragmentation expands the customer/supplier 
range of the firm by making more distant markets available. As markets expand, firms in one 
country supply not only own industry but also get access to foreign producers as well, and 
volume levels rise. Fifth, such offshore procurement can improve the competitiveness of an 
industry whose end products face competition from imports. Industry competitiveness rises, 
and with it employment, wages and output (Jones and Kierzkowski 2001).  
Summing up, fragmentation promotes trade by increasing volumes, opening new markets 
and allowing more products and firms to enter the world trading system. This conclusion 
about trade volume might seem to conflict with earlier conclusion based on the model by 
Venables (1999). The difference is explained by the fact that Venables (1999) studies 
fragmentation from a narrower point of view. He excludes outsourcing and limits the 
situation to relationship between cost of shipping, fragmentation and formation of vertical 
and horizontal MNEs, while Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) take a more general approach 
and regard fragmentation in a broader context in connection with other variables such as 
outsourcing, country specialization, competitiveness of the industry, enlargement and 
availability of markets, the number of firms involved, etc. 
Impact of output level on degree of fragmentation 
Intuitively, greater level of output permitted by world trade should contribute to further 
fragmentation. In terms of Figure 5 increase in level of output induces shift to the next ray of 
production in order to stay on the minimum cost schedule. However, the effect of output 
level on the extent of fragmentation is ambiguous depending on the national or international 
scale. 
Level of output affects degree of fragmentation through trade. In this case it is important to 
distinguish between fragmentation on national and international scale. When the benefits of 
agglomeration exceed those of fragmentation, the firms find it more profitable to locate close 
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to each other. In this case, trade promotes concentration of productive activity, as goods 
produced in one place can be consumed in another and distance to market loses some of its 
importance. Any changes that reduce the cost of trading can be expected to lead to yet 
greater degrees of concentration, often in urban areas with good road and port facilities. 
Therefore, it is natural to associate increase in levels of trade with an agglomeration of 
economic activity nationally. However, at the international level increased trade coupled 
with possibilities to fragment production process will permit more countries to join the chain 
of production. This will be reflected in dispersal of productive activity internationally. The 
effect is supported by increasing return in service links.  
In other words, trade may encourage national agglomeration and simultaneously dispersion 
of production worldwide. 
2.2.2 Service-link costs and degree of fragmentation 
Apart from the volume of trade, service-link cost is an important determinant of the extent of 
fragmentation. The functionality of production chain and optimal degree of fragmentation 
clearly depend on the cost, speed and efficiency of service link operations. Increased 
fragmentation is associated with higher service-link costs because the number of interactions 
and the complexity of the fragmented network rise with a number of components. 
Coordination of a more complex network requires more resources and thus is more costly. 
This is true particularly for the international service links which are more expensive to 
establish and more complex to operate in comparison to the domestic ones. However, cost 
increases due to augmenting number of production blocks whose location steadily involves 
more countries are mitigated by significant economies of scale in service links coupled with 
learning effects and enhanced efficiency. International coordination costs have been 
significantly reduced by recent technological innovations, liberalization of international trade 
in services, unification of legal and regulatory systems, and increased freedom of 
establishment. These cost reductions created stronger incentives for international 
fragmentation. In terms of Figure 5 reductions in the costs of service links both domestic and 
international, are represented by downward shift of production rays 2-4 and smaller intervals 
0-A, 0-B, 0-C.  
Isolated, reduced service-link costs promote greater degrees of fragmentation for any given 
output level. However, it is important to take into account the effect of trade volume on the 
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national and international level. As discussed in the preceding section, trade may encourage 
national agglomeration and simultaneously dispersion of production worldwide, and reduced 
service-link costs will support any of the processes. 
Availability of service links is also a crucial element for development of fragmented 
technologies. In the absence of properly functioning service links the firms are unlikely to 
invest in the fragmented technologies as the benefits from fragmentation will be wiped out 
by unacceptably high service-link costs. Conversely, readily available service links may 
encourage the development of fragmented technologies that will gradually replace integrated 
technologies. 
2.3 Transport as a service link 
It was inferred that trade plays an important role in determining degree of fragmentation and 
shaping the geography of production. Trade offers great benefits yet it is not costless. 
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) define trade costs as “all costs incurred in getting a good to a 
final user other than the marginal cost of producing the good itself”. They comprise transport 
costs (both freight and time costs), policy barriers (tariff and non-tariff), information costs, 
contract enforcement costs, costs of using different currencies, legal and regulatory costs, 
and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail) (See table 6).  
In addition to trade costs, timeliness gradually gains more importance as it will be discussed 
later. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) place timeliness under coordination costs. However, 
timeliness is one of the requirements to transport set by modern production chains and it is 
logical to include it in the presentation of trade costs. 
This thesis is concerned with consequences of fragmentation for the transport sector and 
therefore is focused on transport as a service link. In conventional (integrated) production 
process the role of transport is to link the final products with the market. In a fragmented 
environment, in addition to connection between production and market, transport is present 
at the manufacturing stage. Transportation helps the product along on its way to the market 
by connecting production blocks within the chains of production. Transport addresses 
mainly spatial dimension of fragmentation as its primary role is to cope with distance. As the 
fragmented production is impossible without physical movement of components between 
production blocks, transport becomes an integrated part of the system.  
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Part II:  
TRANSPORT ECONOMICS 
3. Transport market 
3.1 Main concepts 
3.1.1 Definition of transport 
According to Quinet (1993) transport as a marketable good is defined as „a carriage of an 
object of given specifications, e.g. weight, size, or a person, from A to B in a given time, 
under given conditions of safety, reliability or comfort‟. In other words, the type of cargo, 
transit time, place of departure and destination point, and service quality are the attributes of 
transport. These attributes determine the value of transport to the consumer and its cost to the 
supplier. 
3.1.2 Features of the transport market 
As any other market, the transport market is an interface between supply and demand. 
However, a number of specific features make it more complex than the market for most 
goods. To begin with, much of the sector‟s activity is not subject to the market forces and is 
regulated by government. Government regulation lies, however, outside the scope of this 
paper whose main focus is the freight distribution market where market forces come into 
play, and price and quantities are determined by the interaction of supply and demand. 
Second, transport market is a time specific market. Transport cannot be stocked and has to 
be supplied at the point of time it is required by consumers. This characteristic creates 
difficulties for matching supply with demand both in the short and in the long run. 
Third, there is no single market but a wide range of transport markets according to the type 
of freight carried. For instance, the shipping market comprises bulk and liner shipping. As 
different types of freight set very different requirements to transportation system, each 
transport market has its particular characteristics as well as supply and demand structure. 
These multiple markets are interlinked on the demand side by the possibility of substitution, 
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e.g. between modes, and on the supply side by the possibility of switching inputs from one 
market to another. 
Segments and actors in the shipping market 
The shipping market is a specific market for transport services, with shipping companies
1
 on 
the supply side and shippers
2
 on the demand side of the market. Both shipping companies 
and shippers are actors in the transport market, where price and quantity for the 
transportation services is determined by interaction of supply and demand. Various variables 
on the macroeconomic level such as the world economy, political events, world fleet, etc 
influence supply and demand (Stopford 1997:115). These variables on a global scale are not 
under direct control of the actors in the shipping market. I will look at the interactions 
between supply and demand from the perspective of the individual shipping company 
(supply) and of the individual industrial firm (demand). Only fragmentation as a global trend 
in the world economy is taken into consideration, while the rest of macroeconomic variables 
are left outside the scope of this paper.  
One peculiarity of the shipping industry is the division into two quite different sectors, the 
bulk shipping industry and the liner shipping industry. Fink et al. (2001) define liner 
shipping as „maritime transport of commodities by regular lines that publish in advance their 
call in different harbours‟. Tramp shipping ‟refers to transport performed irregularly, 
depending on the momentary demand‟. The division is marked by the type of cargo which 
determines the size of cargo parcel and the type of shipping operation. The principle for bulk 
cargo is „one ship, one cargo‟, as it appears on the market in shiploads, while general cargo 
consists of many consignments, too small to fill a ship, that have to be packed with other 
cargo for transport. Transportation of many small parcels involves different administrative 
tasks such as dealing with shippers, handling documentation and planning the ship loading 
operations, therefore liner companies need a large shore-based staff. The bulk shipping 
industry, in contrast, handles fewer, but much larger cargoes which do not require a large 
shore-based administrative stuff, but the few decisions that have to be made, e.g. debt or 
equity financing, new investments, choice between old and new tonnage, etc. are of crucial 
importance (Stopford 1997). 
                                                 
1  Shipping companies and shipowners are used as synonyms in this thesis. 
2  Shippers, users (of transport) services are used as synonyms. 
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Liner and bulk shipping companies operate at opposite ends of the unit cost function. The 
bulk shipping industry is built around minimizing unit cost, while the liner shipping industry 
is more concerned with speed, reliability and quality of service (Stopford 1997). 
3.2 Transport costs 
Transport economics and international trade use different definitions of transport costs.  
3.2.1 International trade 
One of the definitions is provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Transport cost 
is „all freight, insurance and other charges (excluding import duties) incurred in bringing the 
merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of export and placing it alongside the 
carrier at the first US port of entry‟. Transport costs may also include charges for port 
services and inland transportation. (Fink et al. 2001:15). 
It is common to use freight rates or the difference between CIF
1
 and FOB
2
 prices as an 
approximation of transport costs (Clark et al. 2003). However, transport costs for the user 
and for the transport provider are not the same. Transport operator provides a given transport 
service and incurs a certain cost. The operator‟s cost plus operator‟s margin will constitute 
the transport cost for the user. 
 Transport provider 
Operator‟s cost (Cost) 
+ Operator‟s margin (Profit) 
= Cost for the user (Revenue ≈ CIF/FOB) 
CIF-FOB difference is paid by shippers to the transport company (shipping company or 
other companies involved in case of intermodal shipment) for the transport service provided, 
and thus constitutes the expense for the former and the gross revenue for the latter. 
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) distinguish between direct and indirect transport costs for the 
user.  Direct transport costs include freight charges and insurance which is customary to the 
freight charge. Indirect transport user costs include preparation costs associated with 
                                                 
1 CIF: cost, insurance, freight, i.e. the cost of a good delivered to the importing country. 
2 FOB: free on board, i.e. the cost of a good, excluding insurance, freight and payments for other services involved in 
moving the good from the exporting to the importing country. (Incoterms 2000) 
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shipment size (full container load vs. partial loads), holding cost for the goods in transit, 
inventory cost due to buffering the variability of delivery dates, and the like. Hummels 
(2001) groups holding cost for the goods in transit and inventory cost into inventory-holding 
cost. Inventory-holding cost coupled with depreciation cost due to time lag between the 
order and delivery of the good to the market, represent time costs. As it will be shown later, 
time costs is an important variable in some decisions taken by shippers.  
3.2.2 Transport economics 
Transport economics presents a different picture of transport costs by placing them in a 
wider perspective that takes into account social costs and externalities. It is argued that the 
concept of transport costs goes far beyond the monetary and non-monetary cost for users and 
costs of providing transport services for operators. Table 7 provides a schematic outline of 
the different types of cost involved in transport according to who bears them, who causes 
them, and also according to whether they are tradable or not, internally or externally.  
The total transport costs comprise external and internal costs. External costs are the costs 
incurred in addition to the costs borne by users and suppliers of transport services and 
infrastructure. They include environmental costs as well as the costs of congestion, 
accidents, and use of space. Internal costs include infrastructure costs and private costs such 
as fuel, maintenance, repairs, insurance, taxes, and depreciation. The table is replicated in 
order to give an overall picture of costs incurred in connection with transportation. Since the 
current work is concerned with an individual average shipping firm, only internal private 
costs will be regarded. 
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Total costs 
External costs 
Environmental costs 
Fauna and flora 
Energy 
Noise 
Pollution of air, water and soil 
Landscape 
Vibration 
Congestion 
Accidents 
Use of space 
Internal costs 
Infrastructure costs 
Private costs 
Fuel 
Maintenance 
Repairs 
Insurance 
Taxes 
Depreciation 
Table 7. Structure of transport costs 
Source: Quinet and Vickerman (2004) 
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4. Transport supply 
In general, the supply of any good or service depends on the cost of production, the selling 
price and the profitability of other services supplied jointly. These variables apply to all 
transport sectors including shipping.  
Supply of shipping services will undoubtedly depend on the profitability of the business. 
Stopford (1997) distinguishes three elements of financial performance of a shipping 
company: 
o the revenue received from chartering/operating the ship 
o the cost of running a ship 
o the method of financing the business (capital repayments and interest payments) 
Such decisions as the choice between old and new tonnage, single-purpose or multi-purpose 
tonnage, time charter or spot market, as well as debt or equity financing obviously strongly 
affect the performance of shipping companies. However, I will leave policy and strategic 
issues outside and focus on the way the interactions between shippers and shipping 
companies affect the maritime business. 
I choose profit function as the basis for the discussion about the impact of fragmentation on 
the maritime industry. The starting point for the analysis is a simplified profit function of an 
average company: revenue - costs = profit.  
In order to see the changes in profit it is necessary to analyze how revenue and costs are 
influenced by trade environment and requirements to the transport system. The sum of 
changes in the revenue and cost will show the total effect on profit, i.e. whether profit has 
fallen or risen. 
1. The first step is the analysis of the revenue. Revenue reflects the shipping company's 
possibility to charge higher prices and capture consumer surplus. The major revenue source 
of the shipping firm is its operational activities which are set up on demand from shippers, 
therefore the analysis of demand is a necessary part of the assessment of revenue changes. 
The relevant question is how fragmentation (and other trends in the world economy) change 
requirements and demand pattern for shipping services. 
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2. The second step is to look at the costs by decomposing them and analyzing how different 
features of the fragmented environment influence cost elements. Since lower costs will result 
in higher profit (other things being equal), it is important to identify the factors that influence 
the cost of providing a service incurred by a shipping firm. 
4.1 Revenue 
The shipping companies are trading in four shipping markets; freight market, sale and 
purchase, newbuilding market and demolition market, with revenue generated in all of the 
markets but the newbuilding. Although asset play on the sale and purchase market is a 
significant revenue source, the main cash inflow is still freight revenue (Stopford 1997: 79).  
Francois and Wooton (2001) develop an analytical model of trade showing the relationship 
between the shipping market structure, trade regime and the freight revenue generated by 
shipping companies. The model suits to analyse the revenue side of the equation. It is 
applicable for both bulk shipping and liner shipping regardless of different mechanisms 
prevailing in these two markets. 
4.1.1 Shipping margin model 
It was mentioned in the introduction that transport costs are usually measured as a CIF-FOB 
difference and might serve as an estimator of the company's revenue. Francois and Wooton 
call the difference between CIF and FOB prices a shipping margin, where FOB is the 
commodity price in the country of origin, and CIF is the commodity price in the country of 
destination subtracted import tariffs.  
Shipping margin 
 price paid by importers CIF  
 - price paid by exporters FOB 
 = shipping margin (i.e. revenue for the operator = transport cost for the user) 
 - operator‟s costs 
 = accounting profit 
 - opportunity costs 
 = economic profit 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINITRATION 
33 
 
The shipping margin should be high enough to cover the costs of the shipping firm and 
simultaneously provide sufficient return on investment. 
Description of the model 
According to the model, the shipping margin depends on trade liberalization and on the level 
of competition in the maritime industry. The model shows how interrelation between these 
two factors influences the size of the shipping margin.  
There is trade in a commodity between two markets. The commodity is produced in the 
export market and then shipped in quantity q to the import market. Producers of the good are 
assumed to be small, perfectly competitive firms located in one or several countries. They 
face increasing marginal costs and pay a FOB price equal to pp. Transportation service 
between the export and the import market is provided by the shipping industry at a price σ, 
the shipping margin (which is the difference between CIF and FOB prices). In addition, the 
good is subject to an import barrier in the form of ad valorem (cost of shipping according to 
the value of the good) tariff t. Consequently, consumers in the foreign market pay the price 
that exceeds FOB price as a result of both the shipping margin and the tariff: 
pc = (pp + σ)(1 + t). 
The model assumes that the shipping firms are identical and compete in quantities (Cournot 
competition), and that the real costs of shipping, namely freight and insurance, are constant. 
It also assumes only one stage of intermediation, namely shipping. Therefore, implications 
of having several intermediaries in moving the good from producer to consumer are not 
considered. 
Variables: 
 q – the quantity of the traded commodity 
 σ – shipping margin 
 t – import tariff 
 pp – FOB/ price paid by producers of the good 
 ps – CIF price 
 pc – price paid by consumers in the destination 
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(1) Effects of trade regime 
In their article, Francois and Wooton (2001) characterize liberal trade environment by low or 
zero tariffs and simulate the effect of tariff rate on the shipping margin. The tariff rate affects 
the trading situation through the consumer price. As the tariff is reduced, the consumer price 
declines resulting in the rise of the quantity traded. This rise in demand results in a higher 
price being received by producers. With a competitive shipping industry, the beneficiaries of 
trade liberalization would be the exporting producers and the consumers in the importing 
country. With a less-than-perfectly competitive shipping industry, the benefits of the trade 
liberalization are not fully passed through to producers and consumers. The shipowners are 
able to take advantage of the more liberal trade regime, replacing the part of the tax wedge 
by a greater monopolistic mark-up. As the tariff continues to fall, the shipping firms receive 
a larger margin over their marginal costs, resulting in increasingly large profits. Whether 
shipowners or producers and consumers will benefit from the liberalized trade regime 
depends on the market structure of the shipping industry. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between tariff rate, the shipping margin and the price 
paid by producers and consumers. It depicts a duopolized shipping industry. The figures for 
Price, 
Quantity 
pc 
Pp 
Ps 
q 
t 
Tariff rate 
σ 
Figure 6. Effects of trade regime 
Source: Francois and Wooton (2001) 
Lower tariff rate t results in higher exported quantity q, higher price paid by producers, pp, and 
lower price paid by consumers in the importing country, pc. With less-than-perfectly competitive 
shipping industry, shipowners are able to replace a part of the tax wedge t by a greater 
monopolistic markup resulting in higher shipping margin σ. 
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different numbers of shipping firms are qualitatively very similar, except the case when 
shipping industry is fully competitive with all the benefits of trade liberalization shared by 
producers and consumers and with zero profits for the shipping firm. 
(2) Effects of increased competition in the maritime industry 
The number of firms is chosen as an indicator of the level of competition in the shipping 
industry. When the number of firms rises, the market share of each incumbent firm declines. 
The firms will perceive their market demand to be more elastic and will consequently behave 
more competitively. In the perfectly competitive industry the shipping margin equals the 
marginal cost of shipping. Conversely, when the number of firms decreases, the industry will 
become more concentrated and the remaining firms will exercise the increased power from a 
growing market share. As the shipping industry shifts from behaving as perfect competitors 
to acting as a monopolist, the consumers pay an increasing price and the volume shipped 
declines. The growing gap between the producer and consumer price is the margin captured 
by shippers, and this rises monotonically as the industry becomes increasingly concentrated. 
The shipping margin reaches its upper limit when the shipping firm exploits its market 
power with both consumers and producers. Figure 7 shows the effects of changing level of 
competition on prices, quantities and profits. 
 
Price, 
Quantity 
 
σ 
pc 
Pp 
Ps 
q 
t 
Market share 
Figure 7. Effects of market share 
Source: Francois and Wooton (2001) 
As the shipping industry shifts from perfect competition towards monopoly, shipowners can 
exercise the increased power from growing market share. The shipping margin, σ rises 
monotonically as the industry becomes increasingly concentrated. 
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Figure 8 illustrates the combined effect of the concentration of the shipping industry and the 
tariff rate on the shipping margin. The more concentrated the industry and the lower the 
tariff barrier, the greater is the shipping margin. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Extension of the model 
In their article, Francois and Wooton (2001) limit the discussion of trade liberalization to 
tariff rates. The effect of competition is expressed through the number of firms reflecting the 
competitive environment in the shipping market. However, it follows implicitly that the 
competitive environment is connected to the market power and market structure. In current 
work, I will extend the model presented by Francois and Wooton (2001) to include other 
variable related to the liberalization of trade and concentration in the shipping industry. 
Figure 8. Industry concentration, trade liberalization and the shipping margin 
Source: Francois and Wooton (2001) 
The shipping margin is the result of interplay of two main variables; tariff rate and concentration 
in the shipping industry. The more concentrated the industry and the lower the tariff barrier, the 
greater is the shipping margin. 
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Trade liberalization 
Generally, liberal trade environment is characterized by low barriers to trade. Following the 
classification of trade costs given by Anderson and Wincoop (2004), barriers to trade include 
border barriers and policy barriers in the form of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Border 
barriers are associated with crossing of national borders and are split into five types; 
language, currency, information, and contracting costs and insecurity barriers. 
Although trade liberalization finds expression in different forms as it follows from Anderson 
and Wincoop (2004), I regard only such aspects as tariff rates and liberalization in the 
market for services.  
Observation of tariff rates serves two purposes. First, according to the model by Francois and 
Wooton, tariff rate influences the size of the shipping margin. Second, tariffs influence the 
importance of transport costs in the world trade according to Clark et al. (2003) and 
Hummels (2007: 6) who argue that lower tariffs amplify the importance of transport costs in 
the world trade. Indeed, the fraction of transportation in total trade costs is rising when other 
trade barriers such as tariffs become less important. 
Trade liberalization also concerns the market for services (Jones and Kierzkowski 2001). Its 
implications for the level of competition in the maritime industry will be discussed in the 
chapter 7. 
Industry concentration and market power 
Francois and Wooton (2001) argue that the shipping firm can enlarge its shipping margin 
wedge (between the price paid by producers, pp, and the price paid by consumers, pc, in 
Figure 7) at the expense of producers and/or consumers by virtue of its market power. They 
distinguish between two elements constituent in the market power of the shipping firm: 
ability to charge consumers a price that exceeds the shipping firms' marginal cost and 
monopsony power with producers which results in price and exported quantity less than it 
would be in a competitive market. In any case, market power enables firms to adopt pricing 
strategies such as price discrimination aimed at capturing consumer surplus. 
The general definition of market power is given by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1997). They 
define market power as „the ability – of either a seller or a buyer – to affect the price of a 
good‟. However, they use the term „monopoly power‟ in the sense of „market power on the 
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part of sellers, whether substantial or not‟ (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1997: footnote p.334). In 
further discussion I will employ the term „market power‟ in its general meaning. 
Firm‟s market power is measured by Lerner index which is the percentage markup of price 
over marginal cost. In the equilibrium in a monopoly market, the Lerner index is inversely 
related to the market price elasticity of demand: 
 
The firm's elasticity of demand is an ultimate determinant of monopoly power and depends 
on the following factors: 
o The elasticity of market demand   
o The number of firms in the industry 
o The interaction among firms 
The elasticity of market demand sets a lower boundary for the elasticity of demand of a 
single firm, thus limiting the potential for monopoly power. It shows shippers‟ sensitivity to 
freight rate changes. A less elastic demand curve perceived by firms signifies higher market 
concentration. Being one of three determinants of the firm‟s market power, elasticity of 
market demand influences the possibilities for higher markup for shipping firms. 
An important driver of the price elasticity of demand is the threat of substitute products 
outside the industry. A firm might have monopoly, but its index of market power can still be 
low if the firm faces strong competition from substitute products (Besanco, Braeutigam 
2005). The shippers‟ propensity to substitute is influenced, among other factors, by the type 
of the product and possibilities of substitution between different transport modes.  
The number of firms depends on the general attractiveness of the shipping market and on 
existing barriers to entry. The most frequent barrier that deters entry of new competitors is 
economies of scale. This aspect will be discussed in the cost structure part.  
The interaction among firms refers to the competitive intensity, i.e. whether incumbent 
firms cooperate or compete aggressively for the market share undercutting one another‟s 
prices. I will not perform the structural analysis of competition as it represents a strategic 
issue and will rather focus on market structure. 
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Market structure 
Market power is strongly related to the market structure. If the existing market structures are 
ranged on a continuum from perfect competition to monopoly, market power is increasing as 
the market moves towards monopoly (Davies and Lam 2001). However, monopolies and 
oligopolies common in transport do not exclude the possibility of competition. Even when 
the number of operators is small, competition can come into play by threat of potential 
market entrants. This is the case for contestable market (Quinet 1993). Market contestability 
depends on several factors, namely client mobility, price flexibility and absence of entry and 
exit barriers.  
Client mobility denotes how easily shippers can switch from one transport provider to 
another. Transportation as such may only be a part of the service provided. The additional 
logistics services such as handling and warehousing may put shippers in a dependent 
position substantially reducing their mobility.  
Price is a strategic barrier that incumbent firms implement in order to deter entry of new 
competitors and preserve their market shares. Therefore, flexibility to change price in 
response to competitors‟ moves provides a better shield from potential market entries.  
Absence of entry and exit barriers makes incumbent firms particularly vulnerable and 
reduces their ability to charge higher prices. 
Chapter 7 addresses the effect of fragmentation on the determinants of firm's market power 
and the factors that might limit market power in order to understand the impact of 
fragmentation on the revenue side of shipping companies. 
4.2 Costs 
The analysis of the cost side of the equation will be based in the first place on the operator 
cost function defined in transport economics. The cost function permits to derive some 
important variables useful in the analysis of changes in transportation costs. The cost 
function is also closely connected to the market structure which is essential in the present 
analysis. 
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It was mentioned earlier that operator‟s profit will depend upon the possibility to charge 
higher prices and to press the costs. Consequently, pricing policy and cost savings are 
equally important for the operator‟s profit. 
4.2.1 Cost structure and market structure 
It is argued by Quinet and Vickerman (2004) that cost functions are not solely determined by 
prices of inputs and efficiency of the processes. They also depend on the market structure 
which in turn influences the market power of the firm and the size of the shipping margin. 
Market structure clearly affects the behaviour, pricing policy and as a result financial 
performance of shipping companies. 
The studies of relationship between cost function and market structure (Quinet 1993) reveal 
that, in case of the sea transport market, liner shipping is characterized by monopoly and 
oligopoly, while the market for tramp services is closer to perfect competition. 
4.2.2 General cost function 
The cost function of a transport operator is the minimal cost which must be incurred to 
produce a given quantity q. The cost function of the transport operator can be expressed in 
different ways.  
One alternative is to define transport costs as a function of quantity and price of input factors 
(Quinet and Vickerman 2004). If the operator can use production factors x, y, z, the prices of 
which are px, py, pz, the cost function can be written:  
C = C (q, px, py, pz) 
and marginal cost is expressed as: ∂C/∂q 
Another alternative is to express cost as a function of parameters that capture complexity 
around providing a transport service. A common characteristic of transport operators is that 
they are multiproduct firms: they may carry both freight and passengers, provide a range of 
different services to different groups of customers using a number of common inputs. The 
cost function depends on a range of variables that include the total quantity transported, 
average weight, average length of haul and total length of the network (Quinet 1993). In a 
simplified form this gives a cost function: 
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C = f (R, Q) 
where C – total cost 
 R – the extensiveness of the network of the transport firm  
 Q – the total quantity transported expressed in ton-kilometres 
Extensiveness of network refers to the geographical extension of transport network and 
comprises such parameters as the number of routes covered, the average length of haul and 
total length of the network. Both the transported quantity and the size of the transport 
network are positively correlated with total costs. 
From this function we can define some key economic concepts that have a pronounced effect 
on the financial performance of any transport operator. 
Economies of scale  
Economies of scale are expressed as: 
 
where eR and eQ are the cost elasticities with regard to the size of the network and the total 
volume transported respectively. 
In terms of the cost function, the firm benefits from economies of scale when its marginal 
cost is lower than the average cost, and both average and marginal costs are declining. When 
the costs will rise less rapidly than traffic on a given route, the shipping firm can transport 
higher volumes at a lower average cost.  
Stopford (1997) argues that there is substantial room for economies of scale. As demand for 
imports increases and more distant suppliers became available, the cost becomes offset to a 
large extent by the economies of scale obtainable from the use of large bulk carriers 
(Stopford 1997:126). Economies of scale for a particular ship are given by the relationship 
between cost and size. This relationship will be discussed later. 
Economies of density 
The expression for economies of density is: 
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where eQ is cost elasticity with respect to the quantity transported. 
Economies of density are connected to the size and the structure of the network and are 
calculated holding the network (the number of nodes, length and arcs) constant.  
Presence of the economies of density witnesses that, in any given network, the unit cost of 
transport will decrease as traffic density becomes heavier. Traffic density refers to the 
frequency of transport services. Frequent transport services on a given route attract a large 
number of shippers which, in turn, supports frequency provided. 
Economies of density appear to be significant in freight transportation (Mori, Nishikimi 
2002) and are particularly important in liner shipping due to the obligation to serve fixed 
routes which locks capacity at least in the short run. 
Economies of scope 
Economies of scope are defined as: 
C(q1,q2,) < C(q1,0) + C(0,q2) 
where q denotes the quantities of a number of different goods and C is the cost of producing 
these goods. This condition expresses that the cost of producing two (or more) different 
goods together is less than the costs of producing these goods separately. In terms of 
providing networks, serving a range of destinations by one operator is more economically 
efficient than by several operators as it will enable use of a larger fleet, better management 
of the fleet, higher rates of utilization as well as better prevention of accidents. The existence 
of economies of scope is determined solely by cost structure of particular operators and is 
specific to each separate case. 
Economies of scope and economies of scale are often encountered in the presence of 
monopoly and are therefore important in the market analysis. 
4.2.3 Shipping costs 
It is further necessary to turn from the general cost function to the costs specific to the 
shipping firms. 
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Stopford (1997) splits the costs of running a ship into five main categories: 
o Operating costs consist of the expenses incurred in the daily running of the ship. 
Subcategories of the operating costs are crew costs, stores, routine repair and 
maintenance, insurance and administration. 
o Periodic maintenance costs 
o Voyage costs are variable costs incurred in undertaking a particular voyage. The 
main items are fuel costs, port charges and canal dues. 
o Capital costs depend on the way of financing the business. 
o Cargo handling costs represent the expense of loading, unloading, and stowing cargo. 
They are particularly important in the liner trades. 
Not all of the cost categories mentioned above are subject to the changes triggered by 
fragmentation, be it customer preferences or the nature of the product. Most of them remain 
unchanged regardless of shipowner's decision about the service quality dimensions such as 
speed, reliability and security. Exception is fuel costs under the voyage costs category that 
are extremely sensitive to the operating speed of the vessel. As the speed acquires a critical 
importance in the fragmented environment, fuel costs analysis is particularly relevant in the 
context of fragmentation. Fuel costs as an input variable in a trade-off between fuel savings 
and revenue loss will be discussed later.  
As for the administrative costs, one may argue that demand for higher quality of service 
might result in higher administrative costs. However, the analysis of administrative costs is 
mostly relevant in the comparison between liner and tramp shipping as the administrative 
costs exhibit a big discrepancy across these two sectors.  
The relationship between key parameters such as unit cost, size, and speed influence the total 
cost of running a ship and formulate some fundamental cost-related principles. 
One of such principles is the relationship between cost and size which is often referred to as 
economies of scale. This relationship can be illustrated by means of the annual cost per dwt
1
 
of a ship. The annual cost is calculated as the sum of operating, voyage, cargo handling and 
capital costs incurred in a year divided by the deadweight of the ship: 
                                                 
1  Deadweight tonnage 
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Ct – cost per dwt per annum 
OCt – operating cost per annum 
PMt – periodic maintenance provision per annum 
VCt – voyage costs per annum 
CHCt – cargo handling cost per annum 
Kt – capital cost per annum 
DWT – ship deadweight 
t – year  
As the costs in the numerator do not increase in proportion to the deadweight of the vessel, 
this equation suggests that using a bigger ship reduces the unit freight cost. An example 
shows that for dry bulk carriers the annual running cost per deadweight for a ship of 170.000 
dwt is about one third that of a 30.000 dwt vessel (Stopford 1997: 158). It implies that the 
owner of a large ship has a substantial cost advantage provided the availability of the cargo 
volume and port facilities. However, deployment of bigger ship has its downside in the form 
of loss of flexibility. The size of the vessel limits the number of ports that can be entered and 
consequently makes it more difficult to obtain backhaul cargo to reduce ballast time. 
As it follows from the annual cost equation, the economies of scale are inherent in the cost 
structure of the vessel and are achieved through a reduction of a unit cost. The realization of 
economies of scale will depend on external factors. E.g. transport demand and traffic 
intensity determine whether deployment of bigger ships on a given route is profitable. 
Another important cost-related principle is known as a trade-off between fuel savings and 
revenue loss and concerns the shipowner‟s decision about the optimal speed of the vessel. 
For any ship with given hull design and hull smoothness, fuel consumption will depend on 
its operating speed. Operating speed of the vessel is positively correlated with water 
resistance resulting in lower fuel consumption when the ship is slow steaming. Fuel is the 
single most important item in voyage costs. As an example, fuel costs account for 47 per 
cent of the total for a ten-year-old Capesize bulk carrier under a Liberian flag at 1993 prices 
(Stopford 1997:160). It is worth mentioning that the fuel cost fraction of total costs of 
running a ship varies considerably with bunker prices. However, this number suggests that 
fuel savings might be substantial. Being unable to control bunker prices, the shipowner can 
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still control the level of fuel consumption and consequently fuel costs by adjusting the 
operating speed within the margins provided by ship design. 
The mean operating speed influences not only fuel costs, but also the amount of cargo that 
can be delivered during a fixed period and hence the revenue earned. This relationship 
confronts shipowners with a trade-off between fuel savings and revenue loss. 
It is obvious that freight rates and fuel prices determine the outcome of this trade-off. In a 
high freight market it pays to steam at full speed, whereas at low freight rates a reduced 
speed may be more economic because the fuel cost savings may more than compensate the 
loss of revenue. The relationship between speed and freight rates is expressed in the 
following equation that defines the optimum speed of the vessel (Stopford 1997: 140): 
 
s – optimum speed in miles per day 
R – voyage freight rate 
p – price of fuel 
k – the ship‟s fuel constant 
d – distance 
In addition to the price of fuel and freight rates, the efficiency of the ship and distance 
influence the optimum speed. The possibility to adjust the operating speed adds flexibility to 
shipping firms allowing for a better match between demand and supply for shipping services 
in the short run. 
The trade-off between fuel savings and revenue loss is of particular interest in the context of 
emphasis on timeliness and speed as it explains how the revenue and costs of the shipping 
firm are governed by customer's service quality requirements. 
One should also keep in mind that old and new vessels have different cost structures. 
Therefore, the fraction of different cost categories varies according to the age of the ship. 
The decision about new versus old tonnage is important since the costs of running a ship 
shape the short run supply curve. 
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4.2.4 Shipping costs in liner shipping 
Fink et al. (2001) develop a model of liner transport prices for U.S. imports. I will use this 
model in order to see how fragmentation might change the cost of liner shipping assuming 
that the model is not limited to U.S. imports only but is valid for trade routes worldwide. The 
model relates a price of shipping a product to the marginal cost of service and a markup 
term. Pijk is the dollar price of shipping a unit of weight of product k from foreign port i 
located in country I to U.S. port j located in district J. Φ is a markup term and MC is the 
marginal cost of service. 
Pijk = Φ(I,J,k) MC(i,j,k) 
Markup term and marginal cost term are further decomposed into a number of variables. For 
simplicity I will omit the equations and present the variables in the form of a table. Two first 
columns of Table 8 list the variables for the marginal cost and the markup term respectively, 
while their estimated consequence for the overall transport costs is presented in the last 
column. The consequences are based on the findings by Fink et al. (2001). 
The marginal cost is said to depend on: 
o the differences across customs districts in port services and other auxiliary services 
o differences in the physical properties of shipped goods such as weight and size 
o the share of goods shipped in containers 
o shipping distance 
o economies of scale represented by the total value of imports carried by liners 
o policy indicators such as cargo reservation policy, existence of barriers to the foreign 
supply of cargo handling services, and restrictiveness of the port service regime (i.e. 
the extent to which port services are mandatory). 
The markup term is a function of the elasticity of demand perceived by liner companies 
serving the routes between country I and U.S. district J for product k. The markup is 
influenced by product characteristics and by policy indicators; cargo reservation policies, 
price-fixing agreements and cooperative agreements.  
Not all variables are relevant for the topic of this paper which excludes differences in port 
services and policy indicators. I will describe relevant variables to show to what degree they 
account for changes in transport cost. The relevant variables are marked blue in table 8. 
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Marginal cost (mc) Markup term (φ) Estimated consequence for the 
transport cost 
Differences in port and 
auxiliary services 
  
Product specific effect 
(physical properties)
 
Product specific effect 
(transport demand elasticity)
 
 
Containerization
 
 Reduces liner prices 
Distance
 
 Transport cost increases with 
distance but less than 
proportionally 
Economies of scale  There are economies of scale for 
traffic originating from the same 
port. Small countries are relatively 
disadvantaged. 
Policy indicators
1 
 
Cargo reservation policies
1a 
Cargo reservation policies
1a 
Have no longer an important 
influence on liner trade 
Barriers to the foreign 
supply of CH services 
Price-fixing agreements 
(conferences)
1b 
 
Mandatory port services 
(the restrictiveness of port 
service regime) 
Cooperative agreements
1c 
 
Table 8. Liner costs 
Source: The table is based on Fink et al. (2001) 
Determinants of liner shipping costs 
The product-specific effect is included both in the marginal cost equation and in the markup 
equation but refers to different product characteristics. Physical properties such as weight 
and size influence the marginal cost, while the markup term depends on transport demand 
elasticity of a particular product. Transport demand elasticity is derived from the final 
demand for product in the country of destination. Fink et al. (2001) use product-specific 
                                                 
1
 Comments on policy indicators: 
1. Policy indicators: 
a) Restrictive policies are expected to lead to cost inefficiencies. 
b) Limit directly the extent of competition from foreign liners and thus may push up markups. 
c) Both price-fixing agreements and cooperative agreements are collusive agreements that are likely to push up markups of 
liner companies.  
Price-fixing agreements are more powerful and have a greater impact on transport prices than cooperative agreements. 
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effects related to both physical properties of the good and its transport demand elasticity in 
order to see whether the commodity will be shipped by air or, in case of ocean shipping, by 
tramp or liner. The results show that valuable and light products are likely to be sent by air 
while tramp services are primarily used for heavy commodities with low unit values. In a 
similar study, Clark et al. (2003) use value-to-weight ratio as a proxy for the insurance 
component of liner transport cost. They find out that there are large differences in insurance 
costs per kilogram across countries even for products in the same category. However, one 
tendency is common for all products; the more expensive the product per unit of weight, the 
higher the insurance and hence the overall transport cost. 
Containerization is estimated to be negatively correlated with transport costs. The 
explanation is that containerization reduces services cost, such as cargo handling, and 
therefore total maritime charges. The study reveals that transporting goods in containers will 
reduce transport costs by around 4 percent (Clark et al. 2003). 
Distance has a significant positive effect on transport costs. A doubling in distance roughly 
generates an 18 percent increase in transport costs (Clark et al. 2003). This distance elasticity 
close to 0,2 is consistent with the interval 0,2-0,3 estimated by Fink et al. (2001). However, 
the effect of shipping distance on shipping cost becomes less pronounced on longer 
distances. 
The variable capturing economies of scale is the level of trade that goes through a particular 
maritime route. Economies of scale can be found at the vessel level and at the seaport level. 
In general, most of the economies of scale are at the vessel level but they are related to the 
total volume of trade between two regions. Maritime routes with low trade volumes are 
covered by small vessels and vice versa (Clark et al. 2003). The analysis shows that the 
increase of traffic originating from the same port leads to lower marginal cost of shipment. 
This may come from the fact that higher transported volumes allow deployment of bigger 
vessels, or might induce competition between liner companies covering the route. 
The variables presented above are analysed in Chapter 7 with the view to determine how 
they change in response to changes in the world economy.  
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5. Transport demand 
Transport economics literature provides an overview of the main determinants of demand for 
transport which are general for all transport sectors including shipping. The demand for 
transport depends on: 
o The price of the service 
o The price of substitute and complementary goods  
o The income of potential buyers 
o Quality  
o Consumer tastes 
 
These variables are concerned with passenger transport but, intuitively, can also be applied 
to the transport of goods. Transport is a service purchased by shippers and its demand obeys 
the same rules as the demand for other goods and services.  
In addition to the variables mentioned above, come the requirements that are said to 
influence demand for sea transport services. These requirements are set by customers and are 
identified by Stopford (1997) as price, speed, reliability, and security. Last three 
requirements are related to 'the quality of service' which emphasizes customer's perception of 
shipping as a service. 
Transport can be viewed as an input factor into the firm‟s production process since the firms 
use transport as a link between production segments and a link further to consumer markets. 
Therefore, demand for transport can be explained by means of theory of factor markets. 
From microeconomic theory, „factor demands are derived demands – they depend on, and 
are derived from, the firm‟s level of output and the costs of inputs‟ (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
1997). The cost of inputs corresponds to “the price of service” above, while the firm‟s output 
depends on the consumer demand of the end product and will be discussed in the section 
devoted to the income of potential buyers.  
5.1 Price  
Price of service, i.e. freight rate, affects shipper‟s demand for transport in two ways. First, it 
represents a pure monetary cost that the shipper faces in connection with transportation of 
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the good. Freight rate is a key variable in the shipper‟s demand function as the shipper 
measures the output obtained from use of the input factor against its price. Second, price 
alters the delivered price of the goods transported and their relative prices.  
Sensitivity of demand to price is captured by the price elasticity of demand (for the input 
factor), which is the percentage change in cost-minimizing quantity of input demanded 
resulting from a 1-percent change in its price (Besanko and Braeutigam 2005: 243). If 
quantity and price are denoted by Q and P, the price elasticity of demand is written 
algebraically as: 
 
Price elasticity will normally vary according to the sub-market, time horizon (short- versus 
long-term), the time period considered, and transport mode (Powell 2001).   
It is difficult to measure the demand elasticity partly because the market for most transport 
services is an aggregate of a number of sub-markets, each with a different elasticity. Within 
each sub-market the demand elasticity may also vary depending upon the price charged; it 
may become higher after some critical price level, at which the cost becomes significant 
relative to the end product price. 
The elasticity of demand is different for different transport modes. For a particular mode it 
will vary upon the extent of competition from other modes and the pricing structure adopted. 
It may also vary depending upon the time period considered as it takes time for users to 
adjust their trade or production patterns in response to a change in the cost of transport. 
 
In addition to being a monetary expenditure, price affects the shipper‟s demand (and modal 
choice) indirectly by altering the delivered (CIF) price of the commodities and their relative 
prices. Value-to-weight ratio of a good is a useful estimate of the impact that transport costs 
will have on its delivered price and on the price compared to prices of other goods. An 
example can help understand the logic behind this statement
1. Imagine a 10€ and 1000€ 
good (wristwatch in Hummels 2007) of similar weight and size to be shipped from A to B. A 
                                                 
1  The purpose of the example is merely to illustrate the relationship between transport costs and commodity prices. 
The numbers are chosen randomly and do not reflect real prices. 
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1000€ good has a higher value-to-weight ratio in comparison to the 10€ good and typically 
requires services of higher quality, such as more rapid delivery, more insurance, and greater 
care in handling. Transportation of the 1000€ good will be more expensive but not 100 times 
more expensive than transportation of a 10€ good (5 times in this example). As a result, low 
value goods become relatively more expensive for the end user compared to high value 
goods.  
Example 1 
 
Good 1  
(low value) 
Good 2  
(high value) 
Relative prices 
(good1/good2) 
FOB 10 1000 10/1000 = 1% 
+ Transport cost 1 5  
= CIF (delivered price) 11 1005 11/1005 =1,09% 
Transport cost/CIF 9,1% 0,5%  
 
It is obvious that the transport cost‟s impact on the delivered price depends not only on the 
value-to-weight ratio but also on transport cost's share of the commodity price. Example 2 
illustrates this relationship. Two goods of similar value-to-weight ratio require different 
quality of service. Transport cost amounts to 10% of the commodity price for good 1 and to 
30% for good 2, which results in the higher delivered price for good 2 relative to good 1. 
Example 2 
 Good 1 Good 2 Relative price 
FOB 100 100 100/100 = 1 
+ Transport cost 10 30  
= CIF 110 130 110/130 =84,6% 
Transport cost/CIF 9% 23,1%  
 
Relative (i.e. percentage) rise in the delivered price due to transport costs is lower for more 
valuable goods (with high value-to-weight ratio) than for less valuable goods (low value-to-
weight ratio). Consequently, high value-to-weight goods are less penalized by transport 
costs.  
These two examples lead to the following conclusions: (1) high value-to-weight goods are 
less penalized by transport costs and (2) low value goods will become relatively more 
expensive for the end user compared to high value goods as a result of transportation. 
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5.2 Price of substitute goods and complementary goods 
5.2.1 Substitutes 
The main alternatives to the maritime transport services are truck, rail and air dependent on 
the length of haul. Truck and rail constitute the main substitutes on short distances, while air 
transportation is the major competitor for long-distance shipments. However, even with 
identical service quality characteristics, different modes of transport are not perfect 
substitutes. As some modes might be inappropriate for particular goods, the possibility of 
substitution is determined by the type of cargo. When the cargo allows for different transport 
modes, degree of substitution is reflected in cross-price elasticity of demand defined as „the 
percentage change in the quantity demanded for a goods that results from a 1 percent 
increase in the price of another good‟ (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1997). Cross-price elasticities 
depend on supply in the different modes.  
Modal choice: price/speed trade-off 
As modal choice decisions constitute a centrepiece of demand structure and reflect the threat 
on the part of substitutes, it is necessary to look at the criteria that influence the shippers' 
selection of transport mode. 
In this thesis only long-distance trade is considered. This limitation is justified by the fact 
that blocks of the fragmented production process are usually dispersed around the globe over 
more than one continent. Trade flows between such production blocks are classified as long-
distance. This view is supported by Rodrigue (2007) saying that international division of 
production and trade liberalization permitted by globalization has resulted in additional 
demands for long-distance trade, which relies mainly on maritime transportation. 
In long-distance trade with non-adjacent partners nearly all merchandise moves via ocean 
and air modes (Hummels 2001), therefore, the only source of competition for maritime 
transport is air transport. However, there is imperfect substitutability between air and ocean 
transport subject to the type of cargo. As air freight is not relevant for some cargoes, there is 
no threat of competition from air transport for goods that are never air-shipped. Therefore, 
such goods are excluded from the analysis. The type of cargo is also determinative for the 
choice between bulk and liner shipping. This issue will be discussed in section 6.1.3     
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If product characteristics allow for both air and ocean shipping, shippers choose between 
these transport modes. Seaborne transportation is associated with lengthy shipping times at 
low freight rates, while air transportation offers speed delivery but at much higher cost. 
Hummels (2001) argues that shippers compare greater time costs in case of the ocean 
shipping with premium charged for air freight, and select the lowest cost alternative. Thus, 
air shipping is chosen if the greater time costs of ocean shipping exceed the premium 
charged for air freight. This trade-off is referred to as price/speed trade-off and to large 
extent depends on shipper‟s time costs and time sensitivity.  
5.2.2 Complements 
The increasing transport distances that accompany economic globalization often require use 
of complex chains of modes of transport. When the average haul grows, transportation from 
the point of origin to the point of destination can no longer be performed in a single 
movement. Instead, the goods are shipped to an intermediate destination (a hub or a 
distribution center), and from there to yet another destination. This operation is known as 
transshipment. Transshipment might be confused with transloading, though they represent 
distinctly different concepts. Transloading is the process that takes place when one mode of 
transport cannot be employed for the entire trip, as it is the case for international shipments 
between inland points, when the cargo must be transferred from one mode of transportation 
to another. Transshipment and transloading are inevitable operations in complex transport 
networks where the links between the points of origin and destination are not direct routes 
but several routes, or legs, converging and diverging at intermediate point(s). Though a 
shipment might comprise a number of legs, it appears as a single movement in the eyes of 
the shipper. When buying a service package, the shipper often contacts a single operator 
(usually a freight forwarder) regardless of the number of operators involved. 
The consequences of increasing transport distances are aggravated by more sophisticated 
shipper preferences. In the fragmented environment shippers often require a door-to-door 
delivery. A door-to-door delivery and combination of different modes of transport 
(intermodality) are the principal characteristics of modern transportation. Intermodal freight 
transport involves the transportation of freight in a container or vehicle, using multiple 
modes of transportation (rail, ship, and truck), without any handling of the freight itself when 
changing modes. The method reduces cargo handling, and so improves security, reduces 
damages and loss, and allows freight to be transported faster. Intermodality was defined in 
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the research conducted by Ludvigsen (1999) as „a characteristic of a transport system that 
allows at least two different modes to be used in an integrated manner in a door-to-door 
transport chain‟. The intermodal transit chains usually involve two to four operators who 
perform different functions under cargo movement and whose actions are operationally and 
managerially integrated (Ludvigsen 1999).  
A door-to-door delivery often is not possible without loading, unloading, transshipping, and 
setting up of cargoes. These operations are expensive and time-consuming and frequently 
involve more than one operator. When the shipping firm takes responsibility for the ocean 
leg exclusively, there is a need for participation of freight forwarders that provide a service 
package comprising services additional to the ocean freight, such as warehousing, pick-up, 
delivery, insurance, customs clearance, road and rail transport, inland distribution, etc. 
Freight forwarders are responsible for the integration of managerial and operational activities 
throughout the supply chain in order to provide a seamless transfer of cargoes. This growing 
need for door-to-door delivery emphasizes the need for cooperation between transport 
service providers and for technical compatibility between transport modes. The performance 
of the shipping firm providing the ocean leg in such an environment is strongly related to the 
synchronization of all activities throughout the transport chain and performance of all 
operators involved.  
For goods transport, there is a diversity of types of auxiliary firms, intermediaries who 
perform a range of functions. Intermediaries can be transport operators which undertake the 
operations in addition to transport services in order to provide an integrated service to 
clients. When transport needs are simple to satisfy, final consumers can easily deal directly 
with operators. It is when these needs become more complex that intermediaries come into 
play (Quinet and Vickerman 2004).  
Intermediaries have major functions:  
o To manage risk and uncertainty: provide a greater degree of certainty in the operator's 
revenue stream, e.g. by purchasing cargo space which they sell on to customers.  
o To provide specialist knowledge of transport operations to shippers who have 
infrequent needs for transport. 
o The organization of formalities for customs and other documentation in international 
transport. 
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o To coordinate activities through the knowledge of the market and assure a greater 
matching of demand and supply by achieving a more efficient grouping of demands 
with the availability of capacity (e.g. to assign clients to the most suitable operator). 
Intermediaries can exert greater influence on operators through their greater purchasing 
power compared to single shippers. 
Though the shipper often perceives transport connections as seamless and deals with just one 
actor within the transport chain, the transport system is more complicated. From the 
transport system perspective, the ocean leg can be considered as a ”core” service as it covers 
major part of the total distance between the point of origin and destination, and other 
services might be considered complementary to the ocean freight. 
The main idea is that a seamless cargo transfer from the shipper's point of view is a complex 
process on the supply side. Shipper buys a package which in reality is a combination of 
different services. If the ocean freight is a core service, other services in the package are 
additional, or complementary. The total price of the package is then the sum of the prices for 
different services. The fact that the ocean leg accounts for a little more than a third of total 
door-to-door shipping charges emphasized the role of complementary services and their 
performance (Fink et al. 2001). 
Intermodal transport constitutes a growing share of freight distribution across the globe. 
Transportation, in terms of modes and routing, is no longer of much concern for customers 
as long as shipments reach their destination within an expected cost and time range. Their 
concerns are mainly cost and level of service while for the intermodal providers routing, cost 
and service frequencies gain an ever greater importance. 
5.3 Income of potential buyers 
It was said in the introduction that demand for transport as an input factor depends on 
transport cost and the firm‟s level of output. The cost of transport was discussed above, and 
this section concerns the firm‟s level of output.  
The demand for transport services is driven by the demand for the final product which, in 
turn, depends on a range of factors, one of which is the income of the end users. The income 
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elasticity of demand for the end product is the percentage change in quantity demanded 
resulting from a 1 percent increase in income (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1997): 
 
There is indirect evidence of the rising consumer income in the literature. Hummels (2007: 
20) touches upon the rising consumer income when explaining time sensitivity. Curzon Price 
(2001: 105) also mentions that customers become more demanding. These two comments 
can be regarded as the evidence of the rising consumer income, since higher income is 
usually reflected in more sophisticated consumer demands. How the demand for the good 
will respond to income changes depends on the type of good and consumers‟ preferences. 
The impact of consumers‟ income on the modal choice and requirements to transport system 
will be discussed in part 6.1. 
5.4 Quality of service 
As it was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Stopford (1997) defines requirements 
to transport system as price, speed, reliability and security. I regard speed, reliability and 
security as parameters of „the quality of service‟. Quinet (1993) argues that quality of service 
is an important field of competition among transport operators and is often expressed in 
frequency and timetables and the size of the network. I will present service quality 
parameters introduced by Stopford (1997) and Quinet (1993) and supply them by some 
additional definitions.  
Though price is likely to be a significant criteria applying to transport as a good, transport 
decisions made by users depend rather on the combination of service quality and cost 
considerations. This relationship between cost and quality is articulated through the term 
'generalized cost of travel' (Powell 2001). For passenger transport the generalized cost of 
travel is defined as the sum of the fare and the disutility related to discomfort, time spent 
travelling, and other inconveniences associated with travelling. The cost of time spent 
travelling is based on the assumed value of time which depends on the income forgone and 
the activity for which this time could otherwise be used. The value of time is simply the 
amount people will pay to save time. In economic terms, the value of time equals the 
marginal rate of substitution between time and price. 
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5.4.1 Speed and time costs 
Applied to freight movement, the logic of generalized cost of travel implies that along with 
monetary cost (freight rate) shippers face costs related to transit time. Hummels (2001) 
defines these costs as time costs. 
Time costs consist of two elements: inventory-holding and depreciation costs. Inventory-
holding costs include the costs of goods in transit (inventory in pipeline), as well as the need 
to hold larger buffer-stock inventories (inventory on-hand) at final destinations to 
accommodate variations in arrival time. Depreciation costs reflect the deterioration of the 
product's value over time and explain why a newly produced good might be preferred to an 
older one. In the production context depreciation may also reflect the immediate need for the 
good or component, and lost productivity from the component if it is not available. For 
example, the absence of a key component may idle an entire assembly plant, and an 
emergency shipment may be worth many times the nominal price of the component, while 
late arrivals are of considerably depreciated value.  
Transit times also result in the time lags between production start and final sales. Because of 
the rapidly changing customer requirements the time lags translate into a mismatch between 
an 'ideal' product containing the ideal characteristic set and the product available in the 
market. The shorter the time between production ordering and final sales, the closer the 
produced good matches the ideal type. 
Time costs are related to shipper‟s time sensitivity which is the expression for the 
importance that transit time has for the shipper. High time sensitivity indicates that the 
shipper either incurs substantial time costs during transportation of the good or time costs 
incurred are relatively important. In any case, the shipper will opt for a faster transport mode 
in order to avoid time costs. Hummels (2001) argues that time costs are significant. For US 
trade in manufactured goods he estimates an average length ocean voyage of 20 days to be 
equivalent to a 16% tariff. This means that exporters in the largest manufacturing categories 
are willing to pay 0,8% of goods value for each day of the ocean voyage saved. 
As both manufacturers and trade firms wish to reduce time costs, the fastest possible 
delivery is an obvious requirement to the transport system. There arises a conflict between 
shippers‟ wish to speed up and the shipowners‟ wish to save fuel costs by reducing the 
operating speed of the vessel (the loss of revenue/fuel savings trade-off). 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINITRATION 
58 
 
Time sensitivity and timeliness are related terms yet concern different aspects of time. 
Timeliness which is a synonym for punctuality refers to the deliveries that occur exactly at 
the appointed time without deviations from a predetermined schedule. Anderson and 
Wincoop (2004) define service-link costs associated with timeliness as indirect costs due to 
inadequateness of delivery (Table 6). 
5.4.2 Reliability and security 
Reliability is a typical element of the quality of service. It refers to the ability of the shipping 
firm to consistently provide the quality of service compliant with promises/what has been 
agreed (Stopford 1997).  
Security is related to the risk of loss and damage in transit (higher insurance) and arising 
inconveniences for the shipper and higher administrative expenses. Security minimizes the 
risk of loss or damage under transit. 
Reliability and security are the invariable requirements, meaning that they are not affected 
by changes induced by fragmentation. 
5.4.3 Networks 
Freight distribution relies on networks established to support its flows and on nodes that are 
regulating the flows within networks (Rodrigue 2006). Geographical complexity of the 
supply chain is then expression for the level of spatial fragmentation of production. 
Networks are an inherent feature of transport markets. They arise because operators find 
advantages in exploiting simultaneously various geographical markets. Networks together 
with the price charged for journeys on that network constitute an important field of 
competition for transport operators (Powel 2001). The operators must determine the size of 
network they wish to serve before they can establish their timetables and set their prices 
(Quinet 1993). Network size affects the number and type of the links served and presents 
benefits to the user to the extent that it provides more destinations available without having 
to change operator, more consistent information, higher probability of compatible timetables 
and more possibilities of making changes to times. The strategy of transport operators in 
extending their networks or in increasing network compatibility is usually to provide for 
coordination of timetables. However, most benefits from better coordination fall on users 
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and small operators, while the result for the large operator is ambiguous (Quinet and 
Vickerman 2004). 
From the operator‟s viewpoint, the size of network determines the cost of service through its 
influence on economies of scale and scope and consequently on the price of service. From 
the user‟s point of view, the size of network is a parameter of service quality which mainly 
determines how convenient it is to use the services of the operator(s) providing this network. 
5.4.4  Frequency 
It was stated earlier that frequency is often included as a parameter of the service quality. For 
instance, Quinet (1993: 44) distinguishes frequency as one of the dimensions of the service 
quality when discussing competition among transport firms. In the research by Ludvigsen 
(1999) frequency is also mentioned as one of the service quality dimensions under the 
operational excellence category. It can be concluded that frequency is an inherent feature of 
the quality of service. 
Hidden waiting time 
In addition to the monetary cost of transport and time costs imposed by transit times, 
shippers face a cost associated with frequency of service called hidden waiting cost. This 
issue is addressed in the model of the demand for air transportation used by Norman and 
Strandenes (1994). It illustrates how frequency influences the transportation‟s value for the 
user by incorporating waiting cost imposed by time intervals between departures. 
In the model, consumer demand for air transportation depends on both price and flight 
frequency. It is suggested that the timetable of a transport operator offers users n departures 
per day, with equal time intervals between departures, l = T/n. The users are assumed to 
have certain preferences for the departure time, which are not necessarily perfectly matched 
by the timetable provided. Thus, the desired departure time, z, might deviate from available 
departures (ti-l, ti , ti+l, in Figure 9) causing some inconveniences to the users. The time that 
the users spend waiting due to discrepancies between the desired and the actual departures is 
called „hidden‟ waiting time and is measured by the opportunity cost of time, w=w│t-z│. 
Also, the users derive value, v, from consuming a transport service. Their gross value is 
decreased by the opportunity cost of the time, w, and the ticket price, p, leaving them with 
consumer surplus: 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINITRATION 
60 
 
 gross value v 
 - opportunity cost of time w 
 = net value 
 - ticket price p 
 = consumer surplus 
This calculation shows that the total cost for the users is given by the sum of the ticket price 
and the cost of „hidden‟ waiting time that depends on the service frequency. Consequently, 
when choosing the time of departure, the users take into account both ticket price and the 
opportunity cost of time. This implies that the most suitable time of departure is the one 
minimizing the total cost.  
 
This logic can be illustrated by means of Figure 9. Suppose that the desired time of 
departure, z, lies between ti-l and ti on z axis. When z is near ti-l, the total cost is close to pi-l. 
As z moves in the direction of t, the time difference between the desired and the actual 
Market segment departure i 
ti-l 
 
ti ti+l 
 
z 
pi-l 
 
pi+l 
 
pi 
Total
cost pi + w(ti - z) 
pi-1 + w(z - ti-l) 
pi + w(z - ti) 
pi+1 + w(ti+l - z) 
Time interval l 
a 
Figure 9. Hidden waiting time 
Source: Norman and Strandenes (1994) 
Operator provides departures ti-l, ti, and ti+l with time interval l. The total cost for the user is given 
by the sum of the ticket price pi-l, pi, or pi+l and the cost of „hidden‟ waiting time z measured by 
opportunity cost of time. 
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departure rises resulting in higher opportunity cost and gradually augmenting total costs. 
This is showed by the upward sloping line [pi-l, pi-1 + w(z - ti-l)]. Conversely, when z is far 
from ti, the time difference between the desired and the actual departure is substantial 
imposing long waiting time with corresponding high opportunity cost for the user. As the 
gap between z and ti is closing, the opportunity cost of time declines and the total cost 
approaches the ticket price pi. The line [pi + w(ti - z), pi] is downward sloping. Generally, the 
better the desired time of departure matches the actual time of departure, the closer users‟ 
cost is to the ticket price, pi-l, pi , pi+l, in Figure 9. 
The users‟ choice of departures is obvious. All users with z belonging to the interval (ti-l, ti) 
are split into two groups; those who will prefer departure ti-l and those who will prefer 
departure ti. The division between them is marked by the intersection of two cost lines, point 
a. The users with z<a will choose departure ti-l, and those with z>a will choose departure ti.  
Implications of the model for freight distribution 
The model was used in connection with air passenger transport, but the concept of hidden 
waiting time can also be applied to the freight distribution. In the freight market, shipping 
firms operate a number of vessels of given size and provide a number of departures per unit 
of time on a given route. The cargo owners have their preferences regarding the ETS
1
, and 
the time difference between the desired and available departures gives rise to hidden waiting 
time. The hidden waiting time brings the cargo owner extra costs (e.g. storage costs, 
discounts to the customer for untimely delivery) because the cargo cannot be shipped (and 
delivered) at the desired point of time. If the cargo is shipped earlier than needed, it 
necessitates the use of storage facilities at the point of destination and additional handling of 
cargo. The delay of cargo as a result of later shipment is also a disadvantage as it causes 
waiting time in the production system. In other words, shippers face the monetary costs in 
the form of the freight rate (ticket price in case of passenger market) and the opportunity cost 
of time.  
The model assumes that the distribution of desired departure times is independent of the 
distribution of gross values across consumers and is uniform over the time interval (0,T) 
(Norman and Strandenes 1994). Uniform distribution of desired departure times implies that 
shippers will appreciate as frequent services as possible. More frequent departures reduce 
                                                 
1  Estimated time of sailing 
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discrepancies between desired and actual departure times and, consequently, the hidden 
waiting time. As a result, the value of transportation service for the user will augment. 
Time concept in this paper  
It is important to distinguish between the opportunity cost associated with hidden waiting 
time and time cost defined by Hummels (2001). The cost of hidden waiting time refers to 
waiting imposed by frequency of service and discrepancies between shippers‟ preferences 
and actual timetables, while time costs refer to time in transit, i.e. voyage length. 
Consequently, the shippers will set requirements to frequency and speed with a view to 
minimize costs. As hidden waiting time increases the total time that the cargo spends on the 
way from point of departure to the point of destination, it penalizes time sensitive products in 
the first place. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates distinction between two time concepts; hidden waiting time and time in 
transit. It is worth mentioning that hidden waiting time might occur before as well as after 
transit time. In Figure 10 it is placed in front of transit time meaning that the cargo has to 
wait at the place of departure. On the contrary, if the cargo is shipped and delivered earlier 
than desired, this will cause waiting (e.g. to be processed) at the point of destination, and 
hidden waiting time will be found after transit time. 
Frequency of service matters for both the competition between transport operators as well as 
competition between transport modes. There is high probability that the shippers will switch 
to the operator providing better frequency of service. The same is true if an alternative 
transport mode offers a better frequency. In both cases other variables such as type of good, 
compatibility, customer loyalty and price come into play determining the final outcome. 
t 
Hidden  
waiting time Time in transit 
Time costs 
Opportunity 
cost of time 
Frequency Speed 
Figure 10. Time concept 
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5.4.5 Alternative definition of service quality 
Service quality is an important parameter in transport decisions made by users. A detailed 
account of service quality was given in a research by Ludvigsen (1999). The research was 
aimed to identify the structure of supply and demand for single-mode and intermodal freight 
transfer in the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland), explore the 
content of market demand and assess the quality of performance of operators. As service 
quality constitutes the core of this investigation, its theoretical framework provides an 
extensive overview over main requirements set by shippers to the freight distribution 
providers.   
An analytical model was developed in order to explain the relationship between quality of 
service and the shippers' route and modal choice decisions. The model is reproduced in 
Figure 11.  
The model comprises three types of variables; antecedent, independent, and dependent. 
Shippers‟ demographics is the antecedent variable and consists of the revenue level, the type 
of cargo, types of unit load devices and types of shipment service required. The quality of 
service constitutes the independent variable which is an overall quality standard required by 
shippers. It was measured by twenty quality dimensions that are grouped into 6 categories. 
The quality dimensions are listed in Table 9. Although quality dimensions are identical for 
all Nordic countries, their grouping is slightly different depending on shippers‟ assessment 
and ranking of each dimension. Table 9 provides a synthesis of results for the four countries. 
The antecedent variables are assumed to affect the shippers‟ ranking of service quality 
dimensions. It was hypothesized that the differences in shippers‟ preferences for service 
quality would affect their perception of the quality standards on the routes as well as their 
choices of routes and shipment modes.  
One major finding from the study is that there is little difference between the service quality 
requirements that the Nordic shippers set to intermodal and single-mode transit. Another 
finding is that the cost of service does not function as a single decision-making criterion for 
operator and/or mode selection. Instead, modal choice decisions are affected by different sets 
of factors where price is just one criterion. Type of cargo is an important variable that affects 
the combination of quality elements. For instance, high-value cargo generates preferences 
for short transit time, high transloading efficiency, high quality of freight handling, and high 
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accuracy and timeliness of pick-up and delivery. On the other hand, bulk materials require a 
high level of ULD‟s suitability for the transported commodity and large freight carrying 
capacity for large shipment sizes. Therefore low price of service will not compensate for 
poor service quality. Also, it was inferred that the role of cost level in quality assessments 
varies by shippers. The study also reveals a gap between the quality of service desired and 
the quality of service supplied, especially for intermodal solutions. Quality of intermodal 
routes was generally evaluated as inferior to single-mode routes. 
 
The recommendation for service providers was to guarantee the quality of service compliant 
with shippers‟ requirements at all times. For intermodal operators, the strategy to increase 
their market share vis-a-vis single mode competitors is to ensure the level of service quality 
that would be perceived as superior to the one offered by single mode operators. 
Enhancement of the quality emphasizes the need to develop an exhaustive understanding of 
major drivers of shippers‟ demand for various quality components. It was also recommended 
to vary the quality standards and the cost of services offered to different customer segments. 
Shipper’s demographic 
features: 
 Revenue level 
 Types of cargo 
shipped 
 Types of ULDs used 
 Types of shipment 
served Choice of single 
vs intermodal 
transportation 
Perception of 
service quality 
on the routes 
Route choice 
Antecedent variables Independent 
variable 
Dependent variables 
Quality of 
service 
Figure 11. Variables affecting shipper’s route and modal choice decisions 
Source: Ludvigsen (1999) 
The model presents the relationship between quality of service and shippers‟ route and modal 
choice. The quality of service, the independent variable, is measured by 20 dimensions. 
Shippers‟ demographic features affect the weightings that shippers attach to different quality 
components as well as perception of service quality on given routes. The perception of service 
quality is assumed to affect the shippers‟ route and modal choice. The major finding of research 
is that industrial shippers do not generally differentiate between the service quality required from 
intermodal and single-mode operators. 
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Detailed analysis of logistical parameters of cargo would allow developing customized 
quality packages and a better match between demand and supply. 
Operational excellence 
 Efficiency of trans-loading stations 
Quality of freight handling 
Reliability of service  
Expediency of ordering and chartering 
Service availability at origin points 
Service availability at destination points 
Transit time 
Timeliness of pick-up and delivery 
Frequency of service 
Directness of service 
Availability 
 Availability of unit load devices (ULD) 
Availability of tracing & tracking services 
Technical efficiency 
 Suitability for commodity carried 
Suitability for shipment size 
Cargo risk 
 Amount of loss and damage 
Processing of loss and damage 
Information and value requirements 
 Information promptness 
After delivery service 
Cost 
Timing 
 Equipment free time for loading/ unloading 
Table 9. Service quality dimensions 
Source: Based on Ludvigsen (1999) 
5.5 Consumer tastes: transport and industry 
Demand will also be affected by changes in users‟ preferences and tastes. For passenger 
transport it can be e.g. demand for non-smoking compartments. In freight distribution it is 
not the tastes but the needs of industrial firms stemming from the environment in which they 
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operate. The environment sets requirements to the firms and shapes their demand on the 
transport industry. 
Recent changes in the organization of manufacturing activities fundamentally change 
industry demands upon transport. Transportation is expected to provide fast deliveries on 
frequent and tight schedules over increasingly larger distribution networks. Fragmentation of 
modern manufacturing techniques combined with more liberal trade policies and 
establishment of a geographically large market require high quality of transport service 
because industry‟s ability to take advantage of location decisions allowing for cost 
minimization depends on the provision and efficiency of transport linkages.  Therefore, the 
major requirements to the transport system are adherence to schedules and contribution 
through increased speed, particularly where high-value goods are concerned. 
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Part III: 
FRAGMENTATION AND SHIPPING. 
SYNTHESIS 
6. Inference from fragmentation 
This part represents a synthesis of fragmentation theory and transport economics. It attempts 
at explaining to what extent fragmentation and changes in the world trade account for 
changes in demand for transportation services and shape the operational environment that the 
transportation firms have to adapt to. I will synthesize fragmentation and transport 
economics by describing the consequences of fragmentation relevant for freight distribution 
and analyzing the effect of these consequences on revenue and cost components of shipping 
firms. 
6.1 Inference from fragmentation 
6.1.1 Larger networks and longer distances 
The consequences of fragmentation such as surge of trade in parts and components, larger 
trade flows, availability of distant markets and involvement of gradually more actors into the 
vertical production sharing, influence transportation by making the networks larger and more 
complex. Trade distances within networks also get longer due to dispersion of production 
blocks over increasingly larger geographical areas.  
Distance is positively correlated with trade costs (herein transportation costs) and is likely to 
be more important for parts and components that are more time sensitive than other products.  
6.1.2 Timeliness and time sensitivity 
Fragmentation contributes to the growing need for timeliness by making production blocks 
more interdependent. When the availability of parts from preceding blocks is critical for 
production to keep pace with the schedule, the need for timeliness grows.  
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The importance of timeliness is also enforced by existing industrial practices. Reduction of 
the stock level has for many years been one of the major concerns of the modern industry. 
Various methods (e.g. just-in-time) were developed to attain the goal. The result is smaller 
lot sizes, more frequent deliveries and absolute synchronization of purchasing, production 
and despatch activities. In such a tightly synchronized environment, the delay in delivery of 
one component may turn unfavourable and expensive since it can cause production stops. 
Undoubtedly, adoption of practices that rely on strict adherence to schedules makes 
timeliness extremely important. 
In the past decades time sensitivity has increased, and fragmentation and rising consumer 
income are the explanatory factors behind this process. Fragmentation contributes to higher 
time sensitivity by magnifying time costs. When countries specialize in parts of production 
process, the number of stages increases and trade in intermediate goods occurs. Time costs 
(consisting of the inventory-holding and depreciation costs) are incurred from the first stage 
of production, and accumulate gradually until the final good is sold. When goods spend more 
time travelling between various locations, time costs accrue throughout the production chain. 
The cumulative time costs over the entire finished product will be much higher compared to 
the integrated production. As the composition of trade shifts from commodities to more 
complex manufactures, time sensitivity grows and the importance of time savings in 
transport rises with each stage. Increased total transit time resulting from a higher number of 
production stages leads to greater time lags between production start and final sales 
increasing the mismatch between the delivered product and the ideal one. At the same time, 
rising consumer income supports higher willingness to pay for precise product 
characteristics. That in turn puts pressure on manufacturers to produce to those specifications 
as rapid as possible and to respond to changing consumer preferences in a timely way. 
Combined together, consumers‟ willingness to pay as a result of rising consumer income and 
increased total transit time preventing manufacturers from delivering the exact demanded 
product, contribute to growing time sensitivity. The type of product influences time 
sensitivity to a great extent. 
Time sensitivity expresses the importance that time costs have for the shipper and concerns 
both hidden waiting time and time in transit.  The important variables are distance, speed and 
frequency of service. With growing time sensitivity the coefficient of distance in the total 
trade costs becomes larger as trade between remote countries tends to take a long time. This 
higher coefficient of distance is expected to be compensated by higher speed and/or more 
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efficient cargo handling. Also, time sensitivity contributes to higher emphasis on the 
frequency of service. As hidden waiting time increases the total time that the cargo spends 
on the way from point of departure to the point of destination, it penalizes in the first place 
time sensitive products. This relationship becomes extremely important given the fact that 
goods with highest estimated time sensitivity have exhibited the most rapid growth in trade 
(Hummels 2007).  
In summary, the transportation industry has to take into account and adjust to the following 
factors: higher proportion of parts and components in the world trade, larger networks, 
longer distances, high emphasis on timeliness and growing time sensitivity that create the 
need for fast and frequent transport.  
6.1.3 Type of product 
The type of product determines the importance of timeliness, time sensitivity and distance. 
Especially time sensitivity is extremely dependent on the type of product. For instance, time 
in transit does not matter much for bulk commodities and simple manufactures. Conversely, 
perishable goods and goods with uncertain or fluctuating demand suffer most from time 
costs (Hummels 2007: 19). Time sensitivity is product specific and has consequences for 
importance of distance, speed and frequency. Generally, the more time sensitive the product 
is, the more importance gains distance and the more value is attached to speed and frequency 
of service. 
The effect of distance depends on technical characteristics of the product. If the product in 
question requires frequent changes in specifications or strict just-in-time delivery, proximity 
to the market is crucial, while for standardized parts proximity to the customer is of minor 
importance. Fragmented products are more exposed to timeliness and are more severely 
affected by service-link costs as constituent parts travel between production blocks before 
final assembly.  
Concluding from the literature on international trade, fragmented and non-standard products 
exhibit the highest time sensitivity and elasticity of distance. Therefore, these products are 
the first to require fast transport and efficient cargo handling.  
The effect of distance for a particular commodity depends on its elasticity of substitution. 
The commodity with high elasticity of substitution is more sensitive to price changes 
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(Kimura and Takahashi 2004). Since distance is frequently an estimate of trade costs, the 
coefficient of distance is likely to be larger for products with high elasticity of substitution. 
The type of cargo is also determinative for the choice between bulk and liner shipping. In the 
model of liner shipping costs (Fink et al. 2001) the type of cargo is captured by product-
specific effect related to both physical properties of the good and transport demand elasticity. 
The type of cargo is used to see whether the commodity will be shipped by air or, in case of 
ocean shipping, by tramp or liner. It was inferred that valuable and light products are usually 
sent by air while tramp services are primarily used for heavy commodities with low unit 
values. 
Value-to-weight ratio 
A value-to-weight ratio is the characteristic of the product that exerts influence on price 
sensitivity of the shipper, degree of substitution between different transport modes and 
consequently the level of competition.  
The composition of trade, i.e. value-to-weight ratio of the transported goods, has changed in 
the past decades. World trade in high value-to-weight manufactures has grown much faster 
than trade in low value-to-weight primary products (Anderson and Wincoop 2004). Though 
the aggregate value-to-weight ratio of trade is increasing, it is falling for both air and ocean 
shipping. Hummels (2007) gives the following explanation for this paradox. If we arrange 
the goods along a continuum from heaviest to lightest, goods at the heaviest part of the 
continuum tend to be ocean shipped, and those at the lightest part tend to be air shipped. The 
border between air and ocean shipped goods is not fixed and depends on other factors such 
as product characteristics and freight rates. Due to falling relative price of air/ocean 
shipping, the goods at the margin shift from ocean to air shipping. Relative to the set of air 
shipped goods, these marginal goods are heavy, and the average weight of air shipped goods 
rises. But relative to the set of ocean shipped goods, these marginal goods are light, and by 
losing them the average weight of ocean shipped goods rises as well.  
It was discussed earlier that high value-to-weight manufactures are less penalized by 
transport costs as the effect of the freight rate on the delivered price is smaller, and that low 
value goods will become relatively more expensive for the end user compared to high value 
goods as a result of transportation. These conclusions have the following effects. When the 
effect on the delivered price is smaller, as for the high value-to-weight goods, the shipper is 
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much more likely to use the faster yet more expensive shipping option. Therefore, shippers 
of high-value goods are more willing to pay premium for speed delivery than shippers of 
low-value goods. If transportation is a small fraction of the delivered price, the explicit costs 
of transportation are overruled by implicit costs such as timeliness or reliability. 
Transportation costs constitute a smaller fraction of the delivered price of a high-value good 
compared to a low-value good, meaning that shippers of high-value goods pay more 
attention to the quality dimension of transport service. 
6.1.4 Summary 
Table 10 is a schematic representation of the above reasoning showing causal relationship 
between different factors and the resulting requirements that shippers set to transportation 
systems. 
Cause  Consequence Resulting requirements 
Fragmentation 
Interdependence of production 
blocks 
○ The need for timeliness  
Longer distances translate into 
higher time costs 
○ Increased time sensitivity and 
consequently  
○ demand for speed and frequency of 
service 
Rising consumer 
income 
Willingness to pay for exact 
product attributes 
Type of product 
High value-to-weight ratio 
○ Lower effect on the delivered 
price 
○ Preference to the faster transport 
mode 
○ Service quality is more important 
than price 
○ Lower price sensitivity 
Parts & components vs  
non-fragmented goods 
○ The need for timeliness  
○ Increased time sensitivity and 
consequently demand for speed and 
frequency of service 
Table 10. Requirements to transport systems 
As a result of fragmentation shippers become less price sensitive, more time sensitive and 
put more emphasis on service quality, namely timeliness, frequency and speed.  
This defines a set of requirements to the shipping firms. They are expected to provide fast 
and punctual deliveries on frequent schedules over large distribution networks. Also, 
shipping firms have to handle a higher quantity of goods. 
These requirements can be interpreted as follows: 
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○ The fact that shippers become less price sensitive indicates less elastic market demand 
curve. Lower price sensitivity also plays a role for the outcome of price/speed trade-off as 
shippers can accept higher freight rates. 
○ Time sensitivity increases shipper‟s propensity to substitute to the modes of transport that 
offer an advantage with respect to frequency of service and speed. 
○ Speed is a decision variable in both the price/speed trade-off that faces shippers in their 
modal choice and trade-off between fuel savings and revenue loss that faces shippers in their 
choice of optimal operating speed. Therefore consumers‟ demand for speed matters for the 
outcome of these two decisions.  
○ Frequency has effect on economies of scale and economies of density, and also matters for 
price/speed trade-off. 
The conclusions provide a basis for the analysis of the variables and factors introduced 
earlier in connection with demand and supply of the transportation services. The subsequent 
chapter presents the analysis divided into revenue and cost parts following the structure of 
theoretical part. 
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7. Effect on shipping companies 
7.1 Revenue 
The theoretical framework for the analysis of the revenue of the shipping firm is based on 
the model by Francois and Wooton (2001) supplemented by theory in part 4.1.2 and suggests 
the discussion of trade liberalization and market power of the shipping firm. 
7.1.1 Inference from trade liberalization 
From the earlier discussion, liberalization of trade influences the size of the shipping margin, 
the importance of transport costs in the world trade and the level of competition in the 
maritime industry. It was also stated that in addition to tariff rates, it is important to take into 
account other barriers such as non-tariff as they may intensify or extenuate the effects of 
falling tariffs. 
A number of authors refer to trade liberalization and deregulation that currently characterize 
development of the world economy. For example, Curzon Price (2001) mentions 
deregulation ranging from classical trade-barrier reduction in the WTO, to the unilateral 
abolition of exchange controls on capital movements without giving quantitative estimates. 
The conclusion is concomitant with the one of Francois and Wooton (2001), about dramatic 
reductions in average tariffs as a result of successive rounds of trade liberalization and 
further reduction of trade barriers due to regional arrangements such as the EU and NAFTA. 
Clark et al. (2003) mention policy shift in most countries from import substitution policies in 
the 1960-70s aimed to protect own industry to a more outward-oriented strategy by 1990s. 
They say that recent liberalizations have reduced tariff and, in some cases, non-tariff 
barriers. For instance, Asia reduced its average tariff rate from 30% at the beginning of the 
1980s to 14% by the end of the 1990s, and Latin America reduced its average tariff rate from 
31% to 11%. In this period the figures for Central America and the Caribbean were 21% and 
9%, while African countries reduced their average tariff rate from 30% to 20%. The average 
tariff rates are calculated as simple averages of their unweighted tariff across countries. For 
the weighted tariffs, the resulting average rate will be smaller (Clark et al. 2003). According 
to Hummels (2007: 6) worldwide average import tariffs dropped from 8,6% to 3,2% between 
1960 and 1995. 
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In other words, there is evidence of falling tariff rates and the liberalization of the world 
trade. On condition that the market structure allows shipping firms to capture benefits from 
trade liberalization, the expected result will be growth in the shipping margin according to 
the framework by Francois and Wooton (2001) (Figure 6 and Figure 8). 
Besides, reduction of tariffs amplifies the importance of transport costs in the world trade 
(Clark et al. 2003 and Hummels 2007: 6). As tariffs become a minor barrier to trade, the 
fraction of transportation and other cost elements will increase. Obviously, shippers will be 
more attentive to the costs that heavily influence the total costs. This means that shippers 
become more sensitive to the freight rate fluctuations. 
The influence of trade liberalization on the level of competition through the market for 
services (Jones and Kierzkowski 2001) will be covered in the next part devoted to the level 
of competition in the maritime industry. 
The conclusion is that trade liberalization is expected to increase the shipping margin 
(depending on the market structure) and shipper price sensitivity as a result of more attention 
paid to transportation costs. Trade liberalization also leads to higher competition and an 
increase in scale of activity in service industries. 
7.1.2 Market power 
Demand elasticity 
Elasticity of market demand reflects shippers‟ sensitivity to changes in freight rates. Some 
important conclusions can be made on the basis of the previous discussion. On the one hand, 
growing value-to-weight ratio of goods reduces the effect of transportation cost on the 
delivered price. The result is that the shippers tend to be less sensitive to price changes and 
can accept higher freight rates. On the other hand, trade liberalization manifesting in lower 
tariff rates raises shippers‟ awareness of the transportation costs and makes them more price 
sensitive. The modal choice decision is also of prime importance as the threat from 
substitutes results in more elastic demand. The sum of effects will determine the overall 
effect on market elasticity of demand. 
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Threat from substitutes: modal choice, price/speed trade-off 
In this thesis only air transport as a substitute for ocean transport is considered. The choice 
between air and ocean freight will depend on product characteristics, availability of 
complementary services (service package) and price/speed trade-off. 
It was stated above that goods that are never air-shipped are irrelevant for the analysis. For 
goods that can be shipped by air and by ocean, shippers face price/speed trade-off with the 
outcome depending on price sensitivity and time sensitivity (or alternatively, by freight rates, 
speed and service frequency).Taken into account shippers‟ falling price sensitivity, freight 
rates are assumed to play a lesser role than before. On the contrary, frequency of service and 
speed become important parameters of competition.  
Frequency helps operator attract more customers by satisfying their need for frequent 
departures. The disadvantage of such strategy is higher cost for the operator. By providing 
more frequent departures, the operator will achieve the economies of density, but will 
sacrifice the economies of scale. An anticipated consequence of the need for faster 
transportation is that shippers are likely to switch to air transportation. Their propensity to 
substitute increases further if air transport offers more frequent departures than the ocean 
transportation. These advantages in the form of time cost savings are compared to the 
premium charged for air freight. However, complementary services and development of 
long-term relationships between transport providers and users to high extent reduces the 
latter‟s propensity to substitute. 
The conclusion is that shippers are more inclined to switch to air transport with propensity to 
substitute restricted by the existence of complementary services and tendency for closer and 
more long-term oriented relationships between shippers and transport providers. 
Number of firms 
Trade liberalization manifests itself not only in tariff rate reduction but also in loosening of 
governmental regulation of service activities domestically and liberalization of barriers to 
service trade internationally. By making services obtainable in a global market, liberalization 
encourages an increase in scale of activity and degree of market competition in the service 
industries. The result is the growing number of firms competing about market share and 
stronger competition. Such higher degree of market competition in the service industries 
necessitates reduction of service-link costs in order to stay competitive in the market. 
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Consequently, liberalization of trade contributes to higher shipping margin through tariff rate 
reduction, but also exerts a negative influence by increasing the level of competition on the 
market for services. 
Market structure 
Study undertaken by Quinet (1993) confirms that liner shipping is characterized by 
monopoly and oligopoly, while the market for tramp services is closer to perfect 
competition. Firm‟s market power stemming from market structure might be adjusted by 
market contestability. The question is how the requirements set by fragmentation change 
market contestability and market power of the shipping firms. 
Market contestability 
On the one hand, in anticipation of market development, shipowners can easily switch 
vessels from one market to another in order to capture the highest revenue. On the other 
hand, fragmentation is said to make shippers‟ requirements and needs more unique. This 
means that fulfilment of those needs relies on good understanding and insight into clients‟ 
environment which is usually achieved through long-term cooperation. This idea suggests 
that the relationships between shippers and shipowners tend to be closer and more long-term 
oriented (Janelle and Beuthe 1997). Market demand characterized by unique customer 
requirements coupled with long-term oriented cooperation make hit-and-run entries difficult. 
Besides, unique customer requirements may lead to building specialized vessels designed to 
carry a particular type of cargo. This fact reduces possibilities of capacity transfer between 
markets even further. As a result, fragmentation fortifies entry/exit barriers in the shipping 
market.  
Long-term cooperation between shippers and shipowners substantially reduces client 
mobility. The effect on price as a strategic instrument cannot be revealed as the framework 
presented in this thesis does not touch upon strategic issues.  
Based on the above reasoning, it can be concluded that higher entry/exit barriers and reduced 
client mobility make the shipping market less contestable and thus strengthen market power 
of incumbent firms. 
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7.2 Costs 
7.2.1 Bulk shipping  
It was said earlier that the shipping firms are expected to provide fast and punctual deliveries 
on frequent schedules over large distribution networks as well as to handle a higher volume 
of goods. In this part I will analyse how these changes influence parameters in the cost 
function of the shipping firms. Theoretical part suggests analyzing the impact on the 
elements in the cost function (extensiveness of network and transported quantity), economies 
of scale, economies of density and the trade-off between fuel savings and revenue loss. 
Cost function 
Extensiveness of network refers to the geographical extension and the total length of 
transport network. Greater number of destinations and longer distances suggest enlargement 
of networks in terms of length of haul and geographical scope. As a result, the operator‟s 
costs will augment. Despite the negative effect on costs, transport operators are forced to 
maintain large networks in order to provide the expected quality of service.  
Total transported quantity is another parameter in the cost function and is positively 
correlated with total costs. It means that larger trade flows generated by fragmentation will 
cause additional expenses to transport operators and their total costs will increase. On the 
other hand, large trade flows allow the shipping firms to fully exploit the economies of scale 
and give room for economies of density.  
Economies of scale  
The shipping firms can significantly cut their unit costs through deployment of bigger 
vessels which is encouraged by the need to transport higher quantities of goods. However, 
big ships are not economically efficient when the industry requires frequent deliveries of 
small cargoes with strict adherence to schedule. In this way fragmentation hinders the 
realization of scale economies. Thus, higher quantities to be transported and demand for 
frequency have opposite effects on the economies of scale. 
Economies of density 
Although fragmentation produces small economies of scale, it is conductive to large 
economies of density. Since fragmentation is likely to be found in the manufacturing 
industry, the economies of density characterize transportation of the manufactured products. 
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Mori, Nishikimi (2002) support this view by saying that economies of density is most 
pronounced nowadays in transportation of manufactured goods which uses a wide variety of 
fine components obtained from intermediate good suppliers at various locations. Also, 
higher transported quantity and frequency of service support the economies of density. 
Trade-off between fuel savings and revenue loss 
In their decision about the optimal operating speed of the vessel, shipping firms compare 
fuel savings with revenue loss. The decision depends primarily on fuel prices and freight 
rates. However, other factors such as quality of service cannot be ignored when optimizing 
the speed. When speed gains strategic importance by becoming a parameter of service 
quality, shipping firms are encouraged to speed up and sacrifice fuel savings to the quality of 
service demanded by shippers. Nevertheless, higher fuel costs might be compensated by 
higher freight rates, which is possible by virtue of shippers‟ lower price sensitivity and 
willingness to pay for the quality of service. The possibility to charge higher freight rates 
concerns first of all shipment of more valuable goods. Table 11 provides a brief summary of 
the analysis. 
Consequences Revenue Costs 
Trade liberalization 
Higher shipping margin 
Higher price sensitivity 
Higher level of competition 
 
Larger networks 
Positive effect as network is 
an element of service quality 
Augment costs 
Higher quantity  
Augments costs 
Positive for economies of scale 
Positive for economies of density 
Higher value-to-weight Lower price sensitivity  
Income of shippers Higher willingness to pay  
Quality of service:   
Speed  
Competition from air 
transport 
Trade-off between fuel savings 
and revenue loss 
Frequency  
Negative for economies of scale 
Positive for economies of density 
Table 11. Impact of fragmentation on revenue and costs of shipping companies 
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7.2.2 Liner shipping 
Product specific effect 
The type of good influences both marginal cost and markup term through their physical 
properties and transport demand elasticity, which is a function of the final demand for the 
good in the country of destination. The final demand is individual for each commodity. As 
this paper does not regard any commodity in particular, the product specific effect on the 
markup term cannot be assessed. As for the physical attributes and marginal cost, the shift in 
the world trade towards more valuable products is likely to generate higher demand for air 
transport. Increasing value-to-weight ratio indicates higher proportion of insurance costs in 
the total transport costs.  
Containerization 
An overview of the modern mass transportation does not reveal any significant 
improvements for modal speeds (Rodrigue 1999), yet transport systems cope with growing 
volume of freight. The explanation is enhanced efficiency and cost effectiveness which are 
supported by containerization. Containerization has numerous implications for operational 
efficiency, service quality, port time, approach to pricing, concentration in the liner market, 
and liner costs (Stopford 1997). I will discuss the consequences relevant only for liner 
shipping costs because in the framework by Fink et al. (2001) containerization is a 
component of marginal cost of liner shipping.  
Container is a load unit that has the advantage of being used by several transport modes such 
as maritime, railway and road. When several modes are all able to handle containers, 
compatibility between modes rises and consequently the flexibility of freight transport. This 
growing relationship between freight transportation modes gives liner companies the 
opportunity to offer a „door-to-door‟ service. In a „door-to-door‟ service the respective 
modes are used in the most productive manner, which enhances the economic performance 
of the transportation system (Rodrigue 2007). Containerization confers also significant time 
and cost savings by reducing transshipment costs, cargo handling costs and delays. This also 
contributes to increased flexibility of freight transport (Rodrigue 2007).  
As one of the consequences of containerization, Janelle and Beuthe (1997) point out that 
transportation of containers rather than vehicles and trailers simplifies the clearance problem.  
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A favourable consequence of containerization for liner shipment costs is the combination of 
lower volume flows with enhanced economies of scale. Containerization permits lower 
volume flows and simultaneously offers economies of scale achieved by consolidation of 
numerous shipments in batch flow units (Hesse, Rodrigue 2004). 
The conclusion is that containers and intermodal transportation improve efficiency of global 
distribution and confer substantial time and cost savings. This leads to a growing share of 
general cargo being containerized on a global scale (Rodrigue 2007).  
The liner shipping cost model used by Fink et al. (2001) introduced in part 4.2.4 reveals a 
negative correlation between containerization and marginal cost of shipping. Given higher 
efficiency of freight distribution permitted by containers, time and cost savings, and a 
growing share of containerized cargo, marginal cost of liner shipping will decline.  
Distance 
Since there is positive correlation between transport distance and marginal cost of shipping, 
increasing average transport distance indicates that the marginal cost of shipping will grow. 
However, this negative effect diminishes as the average transport distance grows longer. 
Economies of scale 
The dramatic increase of the total volume of trade does not necessarily mean higher 
transported volume on one particular maritime route. If the number of routes increases, the 
marginal increase in volume might be equally distributed among the routes without changes 
of the volume transported on a single route. However, assuming that the level of trade that 
goes through a particular maritime route increases as a result of the increase in the total 
volume of trade, there are economies of scale at the seaport level and at the vessel level. The 
result is lower transportation cost. 
The above discussion is summarized in Table 12.  
Relevant variables Marginal cost Markup term 
Product specific effect (physical 
properties and transport demand 
elasticity) 
Higher proportion of 
insurance costs in total 
transport cost 
Individual for each 
product 
Containerization Reduces X 
Distance Increases X 
Economies of scale Reduces X 
Table 12. Impact of fragmentation on components of liner shipping costs 
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7.3 Conclusion 
Fragmentation which is an important characteristic of modern economy exerts significant 
influence on the shipping industry by changing its operational environment as well as 
preferences and requirements of shippers. Clearly, fragmentation has consequences for both 
revenue and costs of the shipping firm though its effect is not simple. The analysis of the 
revenue side was based on shipping margin framework supplemented with some additional 
parameters, while the cost side was approached through the study of operator‟s cost function 
and relationships between important variables.  
It was inferred that as a result of fragmentation, shippers become less price sensitive, more 
time sensitive and put more emphasis on service quality, namely timeliness, frequency and 
speed. Consequently, shipping firms are expected to provide fast and punctual deliveries on 
frequent schedules over large distribution networks and handle larger volume of goods. 
As for the revenue expressed by shipping margin, it is expected to grow by virtue of reduced 
trade barriers. Another dimension important for shipping margin, namely concentration in 
the industry, experiences conflicting effects from different forces. Liberalization of service 
trade augments the number of firms, while such changes as unique customer needs and 
development of long-term relationships with transport providers reduce market contestability 
and improve competitive advantage of shipping firms by making clients more dependent on 
specially tailored transport solutions. 
The possibility to charge higher price for transportation is strengthened by lower price 
sensitivity stemming from higher value-to-weight ratio of goods and higher willingness to 
pay for exact product characteristics as a result of higher income of the users of final goods. 
Trade liberalization works in the opposite direction by increasing the proportion of 
transportation costs in the total costs and thus making shippers more price sensitive.  
The need for speed deliveries is obviously adverse as it sets shipping in an unfavourable 
position vis-a-vis air transportation. However, shipper‟s propensity to substitute to air 
transportation is restricted by complementary services and tendency for closer and more 
long-term oriented relationships between shippers and transport providers. Also, the demand 
for speed necessitates higher freight rates in order to offset higher fuel costs resulting from 
higher operating speed of the vessel.  
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Necessity to operate large networks and higher volume of transported goods augment 
transport costs. As for economies of scale and economies of scope, they benefit from 
increased trade flows and suffer from demand for frequency of service. 
The analysis of liner shipping was based on the model for liner transport prices. Although 
the analysis excludes policy issues that play a significant role in liner shipping, it is still 
possible to indicate the impact of fragmentation on liner transport prices.  
Increasing value-to-weight ratio signals higher probability of using air transportation and 
simultaneously higher proportion of insurance costs in the total transport costs. 
Containerization and transport distance have contradictory effects on the marginal cost of 
shipping. Containerization promotes higher transport efficiency coupled with time and cost 
savings as well as permits for economies of scale. The sum of these consequences is lower 
marginal cost of liner shipping. However, marginal cost will rise with rising average 
transport distance. Higher traded volume is expected to reduce transportation cost allowing 
for economies of scale at the seaport and at the vessel level. 
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